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Message-ID: <20250520120000.25501-13-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 20 May 2025 07:59:09 -0400
From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>
To: selinux@...r.kernel.org
Cc: paul@...l-moore.com,
omosnace@...hat.com,
netdev@...r.kernel.org,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 11/42] selinux: exempt creation of init SELinux namespace from limits
Exempt the creation of the init SELinux namespace from the
maxns limit. It was already exempted from the maxnsdepth
limit by virtue of only applying that check when there
is a parent namespace. Otherwise, if one were to set
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_MAXNS to 0, the creation of the
init SELinux namespace would fail.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 4cbf4417eb1b..b2efe6b1e566 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7817,7 +7817,7 @@ int selinux_state_create(struct selinux_state *parent,
struct selinux_state *newstate;
int rc;
- if (atomic_read(&selinux_nsnum) >= selinux_maxns)
+ if (parent && atomic_read(&selinux_nsnum) >= selinux_maxns)
return -ENOSPC;
if (parent && parent->depth >= selinux_maxnsdepth)
--
2.49.0
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