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Message-ID: <20250520120000.25501-35-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 20 May 2025 07:59:31 -0400
From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>
To: selinux@...r.kernel.org
Cc: paul@...l-moore.com,
omosnace@...hat.com,
netdev@...r.kernel.org,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 33/42] selinux: introduce selinux_state_has_perm()
Introduce selinux_state_has_perm() for checking permissions on a
(ssid, tsid) pair for a namespace and its ancestors when there
is no cred available, e.g. for the networking checks.
To support selinux_state_has_perm(), introduce a creator SID field
in the selinux_state structure to save the SID of the process
that created the namespace, or SECINITSID_KERNEL for the initial
namespace. This SID is used as the subject SID for checks in the
parent namespace.
Some of the checks previously converted to using cred_ssid_has_perm()
may be candidates for switching to this new helper even though a cred
was available in those hooks.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>
---
security/selinux/avc.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++-------------
security/selinux/include/avc.h | 4 ++
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index c81b511ed1f8..35cd0c9c9d41 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -1688,6 +1688,43 @@ int cred_other_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *other,
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * selinux_state_has_perm - Check and audit permissions on a (ssid, tsid) pair
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
+ * @ad: auxiliary audit data
+ *
+ * Check permissions between a source SID @ssid and a target SID @tsid for
+ * @state and all ancestors to determine whether the @requested permissions
+ * are granted, interpreting the permissions based on @tclass.
+ * For the ancestor checks, use the SID of the creator of the namespace
+ * as the source SID of the check.
+ * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance with the policy.
+ * Return %0 if all @requested permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any
+ * permissions are denied, or another -errno upon other errors.
+ * DO NOT USE when a cred is available; use cred_*_has_perm() instead.
+ */
+int selinux_state_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ do {
+ rc = avc_has_perm(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ ssid = state->creator_sid;
+ state = state->parent;
+ } while (state);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
u32 avc_policy_seqno(struct selinux_state *state)
{
return state->avc->avc_cache.latest_notif;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ea07fa492e3b..185a528a01c4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5316,16 +5316,16 @@ static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct selinux_state *state,
err = sel_netif_sid(state, ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
if (err)
return err;
- err = avc_has_perm(state, peer_sid, if_sid,
- SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
+ err = selinux_state_has_perm(state, peer_sid, if_sid,
+ SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
if (err)
return err;
err = sel_netnode_sid(state, addrp, family, &node_sid);
if (err)
return err;
- return avc_has_perm(state, peer_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE,
- NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
+ return selinux_state_has_perm(state, peer_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE,
+ NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
}
static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -5345,8 +5345,9 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
return err;
if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
- err = avc_has_perm(state, sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
- PACKET__RECV, &ad);
+ err = selinux_state_has_perm(state, sk_sid, skb->secmark,
+ SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV,
+ &ad);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -5406,8 +5407,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
return err;
}
- err = avc_has_perm(state, sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
- PEER__RECV, &ad);
+ err = selinux_state_has_perm(state, sk_sid, peer_sid,
+ SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
if (err) {
selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
return err;
@@ -5415,8 +5416,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
if (secmark_active) {
- err = avc_has_perm(state, sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
- PACKET__RECV, &ad);
+ err = selinux_state_has_perm(state, sk_sid, skb->secmark,
+ SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV,
+ &ad);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -5600,9 +5602,9 @@ static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
* consistency among the peer SIDs.
*/
ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, asoc->base.sk);
- err = avc_has_perm(state, sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid,
- sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION,
- &ad);
+ err = selinux_state_has_perm(state, sksec->peer_sid,
+ asoc->peer_secid, sksec->sclass,
+ SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -5970,8 +5972,9 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
}
if (secmark_active)
- if (avc_has_perm(se_state, peer_sid, skb->secmark,
- SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
+ if (selinux_state_has_perm(se_state, peer_sid, skb->secmark,
+ SECCLASS_PACKET,
+ PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
return NF_DROP;
if (netlbl_enabled())
@@ -6052,8 +6055,9 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_DROP;
if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
- if (avc_has_perm(sksec->state, sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
- SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
+ if (selinux_state_has_perm(sksec->state, sksec->sid,
+ skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+ PACKET__SEND, &ad))
return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, sksec->state, &ad,
@@ -6179,8 +6183,8 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
return NF_DROP;
if (secmark_active)
- if (avc_has_perm(se_state, peer_sid, skb->secmark,
- SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
+ if (selinux_state_has_perm(se_state, peer_sid, skb->secmark,
+ SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
if (peerlbl_active) {
@@ -6189,14 +6193,14 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
if (sel_netif_sid(se_state, state->net, ifindex, &if_sid))
return NF_DROP;
- if (avc_has_perm(se_state, peer_sid, if_sid,
- SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
+ if (selinux_state_has_perm(se_state, peer_sid, if_sid,
+ SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
if (sel_netnode_sid(se_state, addrp, family, &node_sid))
return NF_DROP;
- if (avc_has_perm(se_state, peer_sid, node_sid,
- SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
+ if (selinux_state_has_perm(se_state, peer_sid, node_sid,
+ SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
}
@@ -7099,10 +7103,10 @@ static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
- return avc_has_perm(current_selinux_state,
- sec->sid, sid,
- SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
- INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
+ return selinux_state_has_perm(current_selinux_state,
+ sec->sid, sid,
+ SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
+ INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
}
static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
@@ -7124,10 +7128,10 @@ static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
ibendport.dev_name = dev_name;
ibendport.port = port_num;
ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
- return avc_has_perm(current_selinux_state,
- sec->sid, sid,
- SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
- INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
+ return selinux_state_has_perm(current_selinux_state,
+ sec->sid, sid,
+ SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
+ INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
}
static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void *ib_sec)
@@ -7739,6 +7743,7 @@ int selinux_state_create(const struct cred *cred)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
struct selinux_state *parent = tsec->state;
+ u32 creator_sid = tsec->sid;
struct selinux_state *newstate;
int rc;
@@ -7754,6 +7759,8 @@ int selinux_state_create(const struct cred *cred)
if (!newstate)
return -ENOMEM;
+ newstate->creator_sid = creator_sid;
+
refcount_set(&newstate->count, 1);
INIT_WORK(&newstate->work, selinux_state_free);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 1916ee418aa3..ffb8946dfeda 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -175,6 +175,10 @@ int cred_other_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *other,
int task_obj_has_perm(const struct task_struct *s, const struct task_struct *t,
u16 tclass, u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *ad);
+int selinux_state_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad);
+
u32 avc_policy_seqno(struct selinux_state *state);
#define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT 1
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 764023bb0340..e1c1b2da9256 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ struct selinux_state {
refcount_t count;
struct work_struct work;
+ u32 creator_sid; /* SID of namespace creator */
unsigned short depth;
} __randomize_layout;
--
2.49.0
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