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Message-ID: <20250613141525.GG414686@horms.kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2025 15:15:25 +0100
From: Simon Horman <horms@...nel.org>
To: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>
Cc: selinux@...r.kernel.org, paul@...l-moore.com, omosnace@...hat.com,
netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 27/42] selinux: introduce task_obj_perm()
On Tue, Jun 10, 2025 at 01:21:58PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> Introduce task_obj_perm() for namespace-aware permission checking
> between two tasks using the objective SID for both tasks and
> without assuming that either task is current.
>
> Convert the permission checks of this form in the hook functions
> to use this new helper.
>
> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>
...
> +int task_obj_has_perm(const struct task_struct *s,
> + const struct task_struct *t,
> + u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> + struct common_audit_data *ad)
> +{
> + const struct cred *cred;
> + const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
> + struct selinux_state *state;
> + u32 ssid;
> + u32 tsid;
> + int rc;
> +
> + state = current_selinux_state;
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + tsec = task_security(s);
> + if (tsec)
> + ssid = tsec->sid;
> + else
> + ssid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
Hi Stephen,
Above it is assumed that tsec may be NULL...
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> + do {
> + tsid = task_sid_obj_for_state(t, state);
> +
> + rc = avc_has_perm(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, ad);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> + cred = tsec->parent_cred;
... but here tsec is dereferenced without explicitly checking if it is not
NULL. I'm wondering if this is safe, e.g. due to the call to avc_has_perm().
Flagged by Smatch.
> + if (!cred)
> + break;
> +
> + rcu_read_lock();
> + tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
> + ssid = tsec->sid;
> + state = tsec->state;
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> + } while (cred);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
...
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