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Message-ID: <20250613222411.1216170-2-kuni1840@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2025 15:22:13 -0700
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuni1840@...il.com>
To: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>
Cc: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@...il.com>,
Song Liu <song@...nel.org>,
Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@...ux.dev>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...ichev.me>,
Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@...il.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Günther Noack <gnoack@...gle.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...gle.com>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuni1840@...il.com>,
bpf@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] af_unix: Don't pass struct socket to security_unix_may_send().
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...gle.com>
The next patch will invoke security_unix_may_send() in
unix_stream_sendmsg().
At that point, the peer socket may not have sk->sk_socket
if it has not been accept()ed yet, which would cause
null-ptr-deref.
Currently, all security_unix_may_send() hooks fetch struct
sock from struct socket but do not use struct socket itself.
Let's pass struct sock directly to security_unix_may_send().
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...gle.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
include/linux/security.h | 6 +++---
net/unix/af_unix.c | 4 ++--
security/landlock/task.c | 12 ++++++------
security/security.c | 4 ++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 10 +++++-----
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 8 ++++----
7 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index bf3bbac4e02a..9be001922e0b 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, watch_key, struct key *key)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_stream_connect, struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
struct sock *newsk)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_may_send, struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_may_send, struct sock *sock, struct sock *other)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_create, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_post_create, struct socket *sock, int family, int type,
int protocol, int kern)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index dba349629229..36aa7030e16d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1625,7 +1625,7 @@ static inline int security_watch_key(struct key *key)
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk);
-int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other);
+int security_unix_may_send(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other);
int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern);
int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
int type, int protocol, int kern);
@@ -1691,8 +1691,8 @@ static inline int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
- struct socket *other)
+static inline int security_unix_may_send(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *other)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 2e2e9997a68e..6865da79ad1c 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1516,7 +1516,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
if (!unix_may_send(sk, other))
goto out_unlock;
- err = security_unix_may_send(sk->sk_socket, other->sk_socket);
+ err = security_unix_may_send(sk, other);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
@@ -2171,7 +2171,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
}
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
- err = security_unix_may_send(sk->sk_socket, other->sk_socket);
+ err = security_unix_may_send(sk, other);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/task.c b/security/landlock/task.c
index 2385017418ca..d7db70790a33 100644
--- a/security/landlock/task.c
+++ b/security/landlock/task.c
@@ -294,8 +294,8 @@ static int hook_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *const sock,
return -EPERM;
}
-static int hook_unix_may_send(struct socket *const sock,
- struct socket *const other)
+static int hook_unix_may_send(struct sock *const sk,
+ struct sock *const other)
{
size_t handle_layer;
const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
@@ -309,13 +309,13 @@ static int hook_unix_may_send(struct socket *const sock,
* Checks if this datagram socket was already allowed to be connected
* to other.
*/
- if (unix_peer(sock->sk) == other->sk)
+ if (unix_peer(sk) == other)
return 0;
- if (!is_abstract_socket(other->sk))
+ if (!is_abstract_socket(other))
return 0;
- if (!sock_is_scoped(other->sk, subject->domain))
+ if (!sock_is_scoped(other, subject->domain))
return 0;
landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static int hook_unix_may_send(struct socket *const sock,
.audit = {
.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET,
.u.net = &(struct lsm_network_audit) {
- .sk = other->sk,
+ .sk = other,
},
},
.layer_plus_one = handle_layer + 1,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 596d41818577..3bd8eec01d05 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -4531,9 +4531,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
*
* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/
-int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
+int security_unix_may_send(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)
{
- return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, sock, other);
+ return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, sk, other);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 595ceb314aeb..07101a2bf942 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5176,15 +5176,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
return 0;
}
-static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
- struct socket *other)
+static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *other)
{
- struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
- struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sk);
+ struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other);
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net;
- ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other->sk);
+ ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other);
return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
&ad);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index fc340a6f0dde..9bb00c0df373 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3889,10 +3889,10 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
* Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
* an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
*/
-static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
+static int smack_unix_may_send(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)
{
- struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
- struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
+ struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
struct smk_audit_info ad;
int rc;
@@ -3900,7 +3900,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
struct lsm_network_audit net;
smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
- smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
#endif
if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
--
2.49.0
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