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Message-ID: <20250613222411.1216170-2-kuni1840@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2025 15:22:13 -0700
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuni1840@...il.com>
To: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>
Cc: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@...il.com>,
	Song Liu <song@...nel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@...ux.dev>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
	Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...ichev.me>,
	Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
	Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@...il.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
	Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
	Günther Noack <gnoack@...gle.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
	Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
	Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...gle.com>,
	Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuni1840@...il.com>,
	bpf@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	selinux@...r.kernel.org,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] af_unix: Don't pass struct socket to security_unix_may_send().

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...gle.com>

The next patch will invoke security_unix_may_send() in
unix_stream_sendmsg().

At that point, the peer socket may not have sk->sk_socket
if it has not been accept()ed yet, which would cause
null-ptr-deref.

Currently, all security_unix_may_send() hooks fetch struct
sock from struct socket but do not use struct socket itself.

Let's pass struct sock directly to security_unix_may_send().

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...gle.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  2 +-
 include/linux/security.h      |  6 +++---
 net/unix/af_unix.c            |  4 ++--
 security/landlock/task.c      | 12 ++++++------
 security/security.c           |  4 ++--
 security/selinux/hooks.c      | 10 +++++-----
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c    |  8 ++++----
 7 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index bf3bbac4e02a..9be001922e0b 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, watch_key, struct key *key)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_stream_connect, struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
 	 struct sock *newsk)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_may_send, struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_may_send, struct sock *sock, struct sock *other)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_create, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, socket_post_create, struct socket *sock, int family, int type,
 	 int protocol, int kern)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index dba349629229..36aa7030e16d 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1625,7 +1625,7 @@ static inline int security_watch_key(struct key *key)
 
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk);
-int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,  struct socket *other);
+int security_unix_may_send(struct sock *sk,  struct sock *other);
 int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern);
 int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 				int type, int protocol, int kern);
@@ -1691,8 +1691,8 @@ static inline int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
-					 struct socket *other)
+static inline int security_unix_may_send(struct sock *sk,
+					 struct sock *other)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 2e2e9997a68e..6865da79ad1c 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1516,7 +1516,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 		if (!unix_may_send(sk, other))
 			goto out_unlock;
 
-		err = security_unix_may_send(sk->sk_socket, other->sk_socket);
+		err = security_unix_may_send(sk, other);
 		if (err)
 			goto out_unlock;
 
@@ -2171,7 +2171,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 	}
 
 	if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
-		err = security_unix_may_send(sk->sk_socket, other->sk_socket);
+		err = security_unix_may_send(sk, other);
 		if (err)
 			goto out_unlock;
 	}
diff --git a/security/landlock/task.c b/security/landlock/task.c
index 2385017418ca..d7db70790a33 100644
--- a/security/landlock/task.c
+++ b/security/landlock/task.c
@@ -294,8 +294,8 @@ static int hook_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *const sock,
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
-static int hook_unix_may_send(struct socket *const sock,
-			      struct socket *const other)
+static int hook_unix_may_send(struct sock *const sk,
+			      struct sock *const other)
 {
 	size_t handle_layer;
 	const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
@@ -309,13 +309,13 @@ static int hook_unix_may_send(struct socket *const sock,
 	 * Checks if this datagram socket was already allowed to be connected
 	 * to other.
 	 */
-	if (unix_peer(sock->sk) == other->sk)
+	if (unix_peer(sk) == other)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (!is_abstract_socket(other->sk))
+	if (!is_abstract_socket(other))
 		return 0;
 
-	if (!sock_is_scoped(other->sk, subject->domain))
+	if (!sock_is_scoped(other, subject->domain))
 		return 0;
 
 	landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static int hook_unix_may_send(struct socket *const sock,
 		.audit = {
 			.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET,
 			.u.net = &(struct lsm_network_audit) {
-				.sk = other->sk,
+				.sk = other,
 			},
 		},
 		.layer_plus_one = handle_layer + 1,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 596d41818577..3bd8eec01d05 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -4531,9 +4531,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
  *
  * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,  struct socket *other)
+int security_unix_may_send(struct sock *sk,  struct sock *other)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, sock, other);
+	return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, sk, other);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 595ceb314aeb..07101a2bf942 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5176,15 +5176,15 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
-					struct socket *other)
+static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct sock *sk,
+					struct sock *other)
 {
-	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk);
-	struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sk);
+	struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other);
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct lsm_network_audit net;
 
-	ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other->sk);
+	ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other);
 
 	return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
 			    &ad);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index fc340a6f0dde..9bb00c0df373 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3889,10 +3889,10 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
  * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
  * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
  */
-static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
+static int smack_unix_may_send(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)
 {
-	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sock->sk);
-	struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other->sk);
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = smack_sock(sk);
+	struct socket_smack *osp = smack_sock(other);
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 	int rc;
 
@@ -3900,7 +3900,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
 	struct lsm_network_audit net;
 
 	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
-	smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
 #endif
 
 	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
-- 
2.49.0


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