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Message-ID: <685c8ef72e61f_2a5da429434@willemb.c.googlers.com.notmuch>
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 20:06:15 -0400
From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>
To: Daniel Zahka <daniel.zahka@...il.com>,
Donald Hunter <donald.hunter@...il.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
Simon Horman <horms@...nel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
Andrew Lunn <andrew+netdev@...n.ch>
Cc: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@...dia.com>,
Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>,
Tariq Toukan <tariqt@...dia.com>,
Boris Pismenny <borisp@...dia.com>,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...gle.com>,
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>,
David Ahern <dsahern@...nel.org>,
Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@...gle.com>,
Patrisious Haddad <phaddad@...dia.com>,
Raed Salem <raeds@...dia.com>,
Jianbo Liu <jianbol@...dia.com>,
Dragos Tatulea <dtatulea@...dia.com>,
Rahul Rameshbabu <rrameshbabu@...dia.com>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...ichev.me>,
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>,
Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@...el.com>,
Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@...el.com>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 04/17] tcp: add datapath logic for PSP with inline key
exchange
Daniel Zahka wrote:
> From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
>
> Add validation points and state propagation to support PSP key
> exchange inline, on TCP connections. The expectation is that
> application will use some well established mechanism like TLS
> handshake to establish a secure channel over the connection and
> if both endpoints are PSP-capable - exchange and install PSP keys.
> Because the connection can existing in PSP-unsecured and PSP-secured
> state we need to make sure that there are no race conditions or
> retransmission leaks.
>
> On Tx - mark packets with the skb->decrypted bit when PSP key
> is at the enqueue time. Drivers should only encrypt packets with
> this bit set. This prevents retransmissions getting encrypted when
> original transmission was not. Similarly to TLS, we'll use
> sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb to make sure PSP skbs can't "escape"
> via a PSP-unaware device without being encrypted.
>
> On Rx - validation is done under socket lock. This moves the validation
> point later than xfrm, for example. Please see the documentation patch
> for more details on the flow of securing a connection, but for
> the purpose of this patch what's important is that we want to
> enforce the invariant that once connection is secured any skb
> in the receive queue has been encrypted with PSP.
>
> Add trivialities like GRO and coalescing checks.
>
> This change only adds the validation points, for ease of review.
> Subsequent change will add the ability to install keys, and flesh
> the enforcement logic out
>
> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Zahka <daniel.zahka@...il.com>
> Co-developed-by: Daniel Zahka <daniel.zahka@...il.com>
> @@ -2068,7 +2074,8 @@ bool tcp_add_backlog(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
> (TCPHDR_ECE | TCPHDR_CWR | TCPHDR_AE)) ||
> !tcp_skb_can_collapse_rx(tail, skb) ||
> thtail->doff != th->doff ||
> - memcmp(thtail + 1, th + 1, hdrlen - sizeof(*th)))
> + memcmp(thtail + 1, th + 1, hdrlen - sizeof(*th)) ||
> + psp_skb_coalesce_diff(tail, skb))
> goto no_coalesce;
Since this is a "can these skbs be coalesced" condition check, move it
inside tcp_skb_can_collapse_rx?
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