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Message-ID: <685c8ef72e61f_2a5da429434@willemb.c.googlers.com.notmuch>
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 20:06:15 -0400
From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>
To: Daniel Zahka <daniel.zahka@...il.com>, 
 Donald Hunter <donald.hunter@...il.com>, 
 Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, 
 "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, 
 Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, 
 Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>, 
 Simon Horman <horms@...nel.org>, 
 Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, 
 Andrew Lunn <andrew+netdev@...n.ch>
Cc: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@...dia.com>, 
 Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>, 
 Tariq Toukan <tariqt@...dia.com>, 
 Boris Pismenny <borisp@...dia.com>, 
 Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...gle.com>, 
 Willem de Bruijn <willemb@...gle.com>, 
 David Ahern <dsahern@...nel.org>, 
 Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@...gle.com>, 
 Patrisious Haddad <phaddad@...dia.com>, 
 Raed Salem <raeds@...dia.com>, 
 Jianbo Liu <jianbol@...dia.com>, 
 Dragos Tatulea <dtatulea@...dia.com>, 
 Rahul Rameshbabu <rrameshbabu@...dia.com>, 
 Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...ichev.me>, 
 Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>, 
 Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@...el.com>, 
 Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@...el.com>, 
 netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 04/17] tcp: add datapath logic for PSP with inline key
 exchange

Daniel Zahka wrote:
> From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
> 
> Add validation points and state propagation to support PSP key
> exchange inline, on TCP connections. The expectation is that
> application will use some well established mechanism like TLS
> handshake to establish a secure channel over the connection and
> if both endpoints are PSP-capable - exchange and install PSP keys.
> Because the connection can existing in PSP-unsecured and PSP-secured
> state we need to make sure that there are no race conditions or
> retransmission leaks.
> 
> On Tx - mark packets with the skb->decrypted bit when PSP key
> is at the enqueue time. Drivers should only encrypt packets with
> this bit set. This prevents retransmissions getting encrypted when
> original transmission was not. Similarly to TLS, we'll use
> sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb to make sure PSP skbs can't "escape"
> via a PSP-unaware device without being encrypted.
> 
> On Rx - validation is done under socket lock. This moves the validation
> point later than xfrm, for example. Please see the documentation patch
> for more details on the flow of securing a connection, but for
> the purpose of this patch what's important is that we want to
> enforce the invariant that once connection is secured any skb
> in the receive queue has been encrypted with PSP.
> 
> Add trivialities like GRO and coalescing checks.
> 
> This change only adds the validation points, for ease of review.
> Subsequent change will add the ability to install keys, and flesh
> the enforcement logic out
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Zahka <daniel.zahka@...il.com>
> Co-developed-by: Daniel Zahka <daniel.zahka@...il.com>

> @@ -2068,7 +2074,8 @@ bool tcp_add_backlog(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
>  	     (TCPHDR_ECE | TCPHDR_CWR | TCPHDR_AE)) ||
>  	    !tcp_skb_can_collapse_rx(tail, skb) ||
>  	    thtail->doff != th->doff ||
> -	    memcmp(thtail + 1, th + 1, hdrlen - sizeof(*th)))
> +	    memcmp(thtail + 1, th + 1, hdrlen - sizeof(*th)) ||
> +	    psp_skb_coalesce_diff(tail, skb))
>  		goto no_coalesce;

Since this is a "can these skbs be coalesced" condition check, move it
inside tcp_skb_can_collapse_rx?

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