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Message-ID: <20250815180617.0bc1b974@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2025 18:06:17 -0700
From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@...il.com>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
linux-sctp@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org, Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
<marcelo.leitner@...il.com>, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v2 3/3] sctp: Convert cookie authentication to
use HMAC-SHA256
On Fri, 15 Aug 2025 14:50:09 -0700 Eric Biggers wrote:
> > > It'd be great to get an ack / review from SCTP maintainers, otherwise
> > > we'll apply by Monday..
> > Other than that, LGTM.
> > Sorry for the late reply, I was running some SCTP-auth related tests
> > against the patchset.
>
> Ideally we'd just fail the write and remove the last mentions of md5 and
> sha1 from the code. But I'm concerned there could be a case where
> userspace is enabling cookie authentication by setting
> cookie_hmac_alg=md5 or cookie_hmac_alg=sha1, and by just failing the
> write the system would end up with cookie authentication not enabled.
>
> It would have been nice if this sysctl had just been a boolean toggle.
>
> A deprecation warning might be a good idea. How about the following on
> top of this patch:
No strong opinion but I find the deprecation warnings futile.
Chances are we'll be printing this until the end of time.
Either someone hard-cares and we'll need to revert, or nobody
does and we can deprecate today.
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