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Message-ID: <aMQ48Ba7BcHKjhP_@krikkit>
Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2025 17:14:56 +0200
From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@...asysnail.net>
To: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@...dia.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
Andrew Lunn <andrew+netdev@...n.ch>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@...dia.com>,
Leon Romanovsky <leon@...nel.org>, Mark Bloch <mbloch@...dia.com>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Gal Pressman <gal@...dia.com>, Boris Pismenny <borisp@...dia.com>,
Shahar Shitrit <shshitrit@...dia.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net 2/3] net: tls: Cancel RX async resync request on
rdc_delta overflow
2025-09-10, 09:47:40 +0300, Tariq Toukan wrote:
> From: Shahar Shitrit <shshitrit@...dia.com>
>
> When a netdev issues an RX async resync request, the TLS module
> increments rcd_delta for each new record that arrives. This tracks
> how far the current record is from the point where synchronization
> was lost.
>
> When rcd_delta reaches its threshold, it indicates that the device
> response is either excessively delayed or unlikely to arrive at all
> (at that point, tcp_sn may have wrapped around, so a match would no
> longer be valid anyway).
>
> Previous patch introduced tls_offload_rx_resync_async_request_cancel()
> to explicitly cancel resync requests when a device response failure
> is detected.
>
> This patch adds a final safeguard: cancel the async resync request when
> rcd_delta crosses its threshold, as reaching this point implies that
> earlier cancellation did not occur.
>
> Signed-off-by: Shahar Shitrit <shshitrit@...dia.com>
> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@...dia.com>
> ---
> net/tls/tls_device.c | 5 ++++-
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/tls/tls_device.c b/net/tls/tls_device.c
> index f672a62a9a52..56c14f1647a4 100644
> --- a/net/tls/tls_device.c
> +++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c
> @@ -721,8 +721,11 @@ tls_device_rx_resync_async(struct tls_offload_resync_async *resync_async,
> /* shouldn't get to wraparound:
> * too long in async stage, something bad happened
> */
> - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(resync_async->rcd_delta == USHRT_MAX))
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(resync_async->rcd_delta == USHRT_MAX)) {
Do we still need to WARN here? It's a condition that can actually
happen (even if it's rare), and that the stack can handle, so maybe
not?
> + /* cancel resync request */
> + atomic64_set(&resync_async->req, 0);
> return false;
> + }
>
> /* asynchronous stage: log all headers seq such that
> * req_seq <= seq <= end_seq, and wait for real resync request
> --
> 2.31.1
>
--
Sabrina
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