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Message-ID: <20251001233304.GB2760@quark>
Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2025 16:33:04 -0700
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
Cc: Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
	Stephen Hemminger <stephen@...workplumber.org>,
	bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
	Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH iproute2-next v2] lib/bpf_legacy: Use userspace SHA-1
 code instead of AF_ALG

On Wed, Oct 01, 2025 at 03:59:31PM -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 29, 2025 at 12:48 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org> wrote:
> >
> > Add a basic SHA-1 implementation to lib/, and make lib/bpf_legacy.c use
> > it to calculate SHA-1 digests instead of the previous AF_ALG-based code.
> >
> > This eliminates the dependency on AF_ALG, specifically the kernel config
> > options CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH and CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1.
> >
> > Over the years AF_ALG has been very problematic, and it is also not
> > supported on all kernels.  Escalating to the kernel's privileged
> > execution context merely to calculate software algorithms, which can be
> > done in userspace instead, is not something that should have ever been
> > supported.  Even on kernels that support it, the syscall overhead of
> > AF_ALG means that it is often slower than userspace code.
> 
> Help me understand the crusade against AF_ALG.
> Do you want to deprecate AF_ALG altogether or when it's used for
> sha-s like sha1 and sha256 ?

Altogether, when possible.  AF_ALG has been (and continues to be)
incredibly problematic, for both security and maintainability.

> I thought the main advantage of going through the kernel is that
> the kernel might have an optimized implementation for a specific
> architecture, while the open coded C version is generic.
> The cost of syscall and copies in/out is small compared
> to actual math, especially since compilers might not be smart enough
> to use single asm insn for rol32() C function.

Not for small amounts of data, since syscalls are expensive these days.

(Aren't BPF programs usually fairly small?)

BTW, both gcc and clang reliably lower rol32() to a single instruction.

> sha1/256 are simple enough in plain C, but other crypto/hash
> could be complex and the kernel may have HW acceleration for them.
> CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH has been there forever and plenty
> of projects have code to use that. Like qemu, stress-ng, ruby.
> python and rust have standard binding for af_alg too.
> If the kernel has optimized and/or hw accelerated crypto, I see an appeal
> to alway use AF_ALG when it's available.

Well, userspace programs that want accelerated crypto routines without
incorporating them themselves should just use a userspace library that
has them.  It's not hard.

But iproute2 should be fine with just the generic C code.

As for why AF_ALG support keeps showing up in different programs, it's
mainly just a misunderstanding.  But I think you're also overestimating
how often it's used.  Your 5 examples were 4 bindings (not users), and 1
user where it's disabled by default.

There are Linux systems where it's only iproute2 that's blocking
CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH from being disabled.  This patch is really
valuable on such systems.

- Eric

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