netdev - Re: 6.17 crashes in ipv6 code when booted fips=1 [was: [GIT PULL] Crypto Update for 6.17]

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Message-ID: <20251008121316.GJ386127@mit.edu>
Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2025 08:13:16 -0400
From: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>
To: Simo Sorce <simo@...hat.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,
        Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@...nel.org>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
        "nstange@...e.de" <nstange@...e.de>, "Wang, Jay" <wanjay@...zon.com>
Subject: Re: 6.17 crashes in ipv6 code when booted fips=1 [was: [GIT PULL]
 Crypto Update for 6.17]

On Mon, Oct 06, 2025 at 03:45:46PM -0400, Simo Sorce wrote:
> Note: this may change going forward, but I am confident that as issues
> arise people will propose upstream patches to keep it as close as
> possible within acceptable parameters for upstream behavior.

What I'm curious about is what falls within the acceptable parameters
of *distro* behavior.  If NIST-certified labs really insist that
certifying requires making the kernel completely unsupportable from a
commercial perspective, at what point will *distros* decide to give it
up as a bad idea, or to have a completely different binary kernel
package that only crazy customers would be willing to use?

If there is something beyond hard-disabling CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1 which
all distributions could agree with --- what would that set of patches
look like, and would it be evenly vaguely upstream acceptable.  It
could even hidden behind CONFIG_BROKEN.  :-)

						- Ted