netdev - Re: [PATCH v4 0/7] nvme-tcp: Support receiving KeyUpdate requests

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Message-ID: <ddadb1f6-d7e9-427d-baf7-814d2288a407@suse.de>
Date: Tue, 21 Oct 2025 08:40:04 +0200
From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@...e.de>
To: Alistair Francis <alistair23@...il.com>
Cc: chuck.lever@...cle.com, hare@...nel.org,
 kernel-tls-handshake@...ts.linux.dev, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-nvme@...ts.infradead.org, linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org,
 kbusch@...nel.org, axboe@...nel.dk, hch@....de, sagi@...mberg.me,
 kch@...dia.com, Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/7] nvme-tcp: Support receiving KeyUpdate requests

On 10/21/25 03:01, Alistair Francis wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 21, 2025 at 3:46 AM Hannes Reinecke <hare@...e.de> wrote:
>>
>> On 10/17/25 06:23, alistair23@...il.com wrote:
>>> From: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@....com>
>>>
>>> The TLS 1.3 specification allows the TLS client or server to send a
>>> KeyUpdate. This is generally used when the sequence is about to
>>> overflow or after a certain amount of bytes have been encrypted.
>>>
>>> The TLS spec doesn't mandate the conditions though, so a KeyUpdate
>>> can be sent by the TLS client or server at any time. This includes
>>> when running NVMe-OF over a TLS 1.3 connection.
>>>
>>> As such Linux should be able to handle a KeyUpdate event, as the
>>> other NVMe side could initiate a KeyUpdate.
>>>
>>> Upcoming WD NVMe-TCP hardware controllers implement TLS support
>>> and send KeyUpdate requests.
>>>
>>> This series builds on top of the existing TLS EKEYEXPIRED work,
>>> which already detects a KeyUpdate request. We can now pass that
>>> information up to the NVMe layer (target and host) and then pass
>>> it up to userspace.
>>>
>>> Userspace (ktls-utils) will need to save the connection state
>>> in the keyring during the initial handshake. The kernel then
>>> provides the key serial back to userspace when handling a
>>> KeyUpdate. Userspace can use this to restore the connection
>>> information and then update the keys, this final process
>>> is similar to the initial handshake.
>>>
>>
>> I am rather sceptical at the current tlshd implementation.
>> At which place do you update the sending keys?
> 
> The sending keys are updated as part of gnutls_session_key_update().
> 
> gnutls_session_key_update() calls update_sending_key() which updates
> the sending keys.
> 
> The idea is that when the sequence number is about to overflow the
> kernel will request userspace to update the sending keys via the
> HANDSHAKE_KEY_UPDATE_TYPE_SEND key_update_type. Userspace updates the
> keys and initiates a KeyUpdate.
> 
That's also what the spec says.
But in order to do that we would need to get hold of the sequence
number, which currently is internal to gnutls.
Can we extract it from the session information?
And can we display it in sysfs, to give users information
whether a KeyUpdate had happened?

Cheers,

Hannes
-- 
Dr. Hannes Reinecke                  Kernel Storage Architect
hare@...e.de                                +49 911 74053 688
SUSE Software Solutions GmbH, Frankenstr. 146, 90461 Nürnberg
HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: I. Totev, A. McDonald, W. Knoblich