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Message-ID: <20251022164300.GA245108@google.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2025 16:43:00 +0000
From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
To: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [bug report] tcp: Convert tcp-md5 to use MD5 library instead of
crypto_ahash
On Wed, Oct 22, 2025 at 01:56:47PM +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> Hello Eric Biggers,
>
> Commit 37a183d3b7cd ("tcp: Convert tcp-md5 to use MD5 library instead
> of crypto_ahash") from Oct 14, 2025 (linux-next), leads to the
> following Smatch static checker warning:
>
> net/ipv4/tcp.c:4911 tcp_inbound_md5_hash()
> error: we previously assumed 'key' could be null (see line 4900)
>
> net/ipv4/tcp.c
> 4884 tcp_inbound_md5_hash(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb,
> 4885 const void *saddr, const void *daddr,
> 4886 int family, int l3index, const __u8 *hash_location)
> 4887 {
> 4888 /* This gets called for each TCP segment that has TCP-MD5 option.
> 4889 * We have 3 drop cases:
> 4890 * o No MD5 hash and one expected.
> 4891 * o MD5 hash and we're not expecting one.
> 4892 * o MD5 hash and its wrong.
> 4893 */
> 4894 const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
> 4895 struct tcp_md5sig_key *key;
> 4896 u8 newhash[16];
> 4897
> 4898 key = tcp_md5_do_lookup(sk, l3index, saddr, family);
> 4899
> 4900 if (!key && hash_location) {
>
> If key is NULL and hash_location is zero
>
> 4901 NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPMD5UNEXPECTED);
> 4902 trace_tcp_hash_md5_unexpected(sk, skb);
> 4903 return SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_MD5UNEXPECTED;
> 4904 }
> 4905
> 4906 /* Check the signature.
> 4907 * To support dual stack listeners, we need to handle
> 4908 * IPv4-mapped case.
> 4909 */
> 4910 if (family == AF_INET)
> 4911 tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb(newhash, key, NULL, skb);
> 4912 else
> 4913 tp->af_specific->calc_md5_hash(newhash, key, NULL, skb);
>
> then we are toasted one way or the other.
>
> 4914 if (memcmp(hash_location, newhash, 16) != 0) {
> 4915 NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPMD5FAILURE);
> 4916 trace_tcp_hash_md5_mismatch(sk, skb);
> 4917 return SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_MD5FAILURE;
> 4918 }
> 4919 return SKB_NOT_DROPPED_YET;
> 4920 }
Thanks. I don't think there's a problem with this patch: it just
simplified the code, which happened to make this warning visible. If
both key and hash_location are NULL, then 'key' gets dereferenced in
tcp_md5_hash_key(), both before and after this patch. If only
'hash_location' is NULL, then it gets dereferenced when comparing the
hash values. Before this patch it was conditional on
tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb() succeeding, whereas after it's unconditional. But
tcp_v4_md5_hash_skb() should never have failed anyway, and even if it
did, its failure or success was unrelated to hash_location.
Looking at the calling code in tcp_inbound_hash(), it actually
guarantees hash_location != NULL. So, that's why it works.
So, the misleading null check of hash_location in tcp_inbound_md5_hash()
should just be deleted.
- Eric
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