netdev - Re: [PATCH net v5] virtio-net: fix received length check in big packets

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Message-ID: <1761527437.6478114-1-xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2025 09:10:37 +0800
From: Xuan Zhuo <xuanzhuo@...ux.alibaba.com>
To: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@...il.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>,
 Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
 Eugenio Pérez <eperezma@...hat.com>,
 Andrew Lunn <andrew+netdev@...n.ch>,
 "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
 Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
 Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
 Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
 Gavin Li <gavinl@...dia.com>,
 Gavi Teitz <gavi@...dia.com>,
 Parav Pandit <parav@...dia.com>,
 virtualization@...ts.linux.dev,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@...il.com>,
 stable@...r.kernel.org,
 netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net v5] virtio-net: fix received length check in big packets

On Fri, 24 Oct 2025 22:06:49 +0700, Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@...il.com> wrote:
> Since commit 4959aebba8c0 ("virtio-net: use mtu size as buffer length
> for big packets"), when guest gso is off, the allocated size for big
> packets is not MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE anymore but depends on
> negotiated MTU. The number of allocated frags for big packets is stored
> in vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags.
>
> Because the host announced buffer length can be malicious (e.g. the host
> vhost_net driver's get_rx_bufs is modified to announce incorrect
> length), we need a check in virtio_net receive path. Currently, the
> check is not adapted to the new change which can lead to NULL page
> pointer dereference in the below while loop when receiving length that
> is larger than the allocated one.
>
> This commit fixes the received length check corresponding to the new
> change.
>
> Fixes: 4959aebba8c0 ("virtio-net: use mtu size as buffer length for big packets")
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99@...il.com>
> ---
> Changes in v5:
> - Move the length check to receive_big
> - Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20251022160623.51191-1-minhquangbui99@gmail.com/
> Changes in v4:
> - Remove unrelated changes, add more comments
> - Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20251021154534.53045-1-minhquangbui99@gmail.com/
> Changes in v3:
> - Convert BUG_ON to WARN_ON_ONCE
> - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250708144206.95091-1-minhquangbui99@gmail.com/
> Changes in v2:
> - Remove incorrect give_pages call
> - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250706141150.25344-1-minhquangbui99@gmail.com/
> ---
>  drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 25 ++++++++++++-------------
>  1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
> index a757cbcab87f..2c3f544add5e 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
> @@ -910,17 +910,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *page_to_skb(struct virtnet_info *vi,
>  		goto ok;
>  	}
>
> -	/*
> -	 * Verify that we can indeed put this data into a skb.
> -	 * This is here to handle cases when the device erroneously
> -	 * tries to receive more than is possible. This is usually
> -	 * the case of a broken device.
> -	 */
> -	if (unlikely(len > MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE)) {
> -		net_dbg_ratelimited("%s: too much data\n", skb->dev->name);
> -		dev_kfree_skb(skb);
> -		return NULL;
> -	}
>  	BUG_ON(offset >= PAGE_SIZE);
>  	while (len) {
>  		unsigned int frag_size = min((unsigned)PAGE_SIZE - offset, len);
> @@ -2107,9 +2096,19 @@ static struct sk_buff *receive_big(struct net_device *dev,
>  				   struct virtnet_rq_stats *stats)
>  {
>  	struct page *page = buf;
> -	struct sk_buff *skb =
> -		page_to_skb(vi, rq, page, 0, len, PAGE_SIZE, 0);
> +	struct sk_buff *skb;
> +
> +	/* Make sure that len does not exceed the allocated size in
> +	 * add_recvbuf_big.
> +	 */
> +	if (unlikely(len > vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags * PAGE_SIZE)) {


I think should be:

	if (unlikely(len > (vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags + 1) * PAGE_SIZE)) {

Thanks


> +		pr_debug("%s: rx error: len %u exceeds allocate size %lu\n",
> +			 dev->name, len,
> +			 vi->big_packets_num_skbfrags * PAGE_SIZE);
> +		goto err;
> +	}
>
> +	skb = page_to_skb(vi, rq, page, 0, len, PAGE_SIZE, 0);
>  	u64_stats_add(&stats->bytes, len - vi->hdr_len);
>  	if (unlikely(!skb))
>  		goto err;
> --
> 2.43.0
>