netdev - Re: [RFC PATCH v4 01/19] landlock: Support socket access-control

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Message-ID: <20251122.d391a246d7dd@gnoack.org>
Date: Sat, 22 Nov 2025 13:18:00 +0100
From: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@...il.com>
To: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@...wei-partners.com>, mic@...ikod.net
Cc: mic@...ikod.net, gnoack@...gle.com, willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com,
	matthieu@...fet.re, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org, netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org,
	yusongping@...wei.com, artem.kuzin@...wei.com,
	konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v4 01/19] landlock: Support socket access-control

On Sat, Nov 22, 2025 at 02:13:08PM +0300, Mikhail Ivanov wrote:
> On 11/22/2025 1:49 PM, Günther Noack wrote:
> > (Remark, should those be exposed as constants?)
> 
> I thought it could overcomplicate socket rules definition and Landlock
> API. Do you think introducing such constants will be better decision?

No, I am not convinced either.  FWIW, there is a bit of prior art for
"wildcard-like" -1 constants (grepping include/uapi for 'define.*-1'),
but then again, the places where people did the opposite are hard to
grep for.  I would also be OK if we documented "-1" in that place and
left out the constant.

Mickaël, maybe you have a preference for the API style here?


> > > diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> > > index 33eafb71e4f3..e9f500f97c86 100644
> > > --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> > > +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> > > @@ -407,6 +458,8 @@ static int add_rule_net_port(struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset,
> > >    *   &landlock_net_port_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the ruleset
> > >    *   handled accesses)
> > >    * - %EINVAL: &landlock_net_port_attr.port is greater than 65535;
> > > + * - %EINVAL: &landlock_socket_attr.{family, type} are greater than 254 or
> > > + *   &landlock_socket_attr.protocol is greater than 65534;
> > 
> > Hmm, this is a bit annoying that these values have such unusual
> > bounds, even though the input parameters are 32 bit.  We are exposing
> > a little bit that we are internally storing this with only 8 and 16
> > bits...  (I don't know a better solution immediately either, though. I
> > think we discussed this on a previous version of the patch set as well
> > and ended up with permitting larger values than the narrower SOCK_MAX
> > etc bounds.)
> 
> I agree, one of the possible solutions may be to store larger values in
> socket keys (eg. s32), but this would require to make a separate
> interface for storing socket rules (in order to not change key size for
> other type of rules which is currently 32-64 bit depending on virtual
> address size).

Yes, I'd be OK with it.

Do I remember this correctly that we settled on enforcing the looser
UINT8_MAX and UINT16_MAX instead of SOCK_MAX, AF_MAX, which we used in
v3 and before?  I tried to find the conversation but could not find it
any more.  (Or did you have other reasons why you switched the
implementation to use these larger bounds?)

Thanks,
–Günther