netdev - [PATCH RFC bpf-next 11/15] bpf, verifier: Remove side effects from may_access_direct_pkt

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Message-Id: <20251124-skb-meta-safeproof-netdevs-rx-only-v1-11-8978f5054417@cloudflare.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2025 17:28:47 +0100
From: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@...udflare.com>
To: bpf@...r.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...udflare.com, 
 Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>
Subject: [PATCH RFC bpf-next 11/15] bpf, verifier: Remove side effects from
 may_access_direct_pkt_data

The may_access_direct_pkt_data() helper sets env->seen_direct_write as a
side effect, which creates awkward calling patterns:

- check_special_kfunc() has a comment warning readers about the side effect
- specialize_kfunc() must save and restore the flag around the call

Make the helper a pure function by moving the seen_direct_write flag
setting to call sites that need it.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@...udflare.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 33 ++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index ff40e5e65c43..64a04b7dd500 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -6085,13 +6085,9 @@ static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		if (meta)
 			return meta->pkt_access;
 
-		env->seen_direct_write = true;
 		return true;
 
 	case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT:
-		if (t == BPF_WRITE)
-			env->seen_direct_write = true;
-
 		return true;
 
 	default:
@@ -7619,15 +7615,17 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
 			err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size,
 						value_regno, insn_idx);
 	} else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) {
-		if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) {
-			verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n");
-			return -EACCES;
-		}
-		if (t == BPF_WRITE && value_regno >= 0 &&
-		    is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
-			verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n",
-				value_regno);
-			return -EACCES;
+		if (t == BPF_WRITE) {
+			if (!may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE)) {
+				verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n");
+				return -EACCES;
+			}
+			if (value_regno >= 0 && is_pointer_value(env, value_regno)) {
+				verbose(env, "R%d leaks addr into packet\n",
+					value_regno);
+				return -EACCES;
+			}
+			env->seen_direct_write = true;
 		}
 		err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size, false);
 		if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
@@ -13766,11 +13764,11 @@ static int check_special_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_ca
 		if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_slice]) {
 			regs[BPF_REG_0].type |= MEM_RDONLY;
 		} else {
-			/* this will set env->seen_direct_write to true */
 			if (!may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE)) {
 				verbose(env, "the prog does not allow writes to packet data\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
+			env->seen_direct_write = true;
 		}
 
 		if (!meta->initialized_dynptr.id) {
@@ -21810,7 +21808,6 @@ static void specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			     u32 func_id, u16 offset, unsigned long *addr)
 {
 	struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;
-	bool seen_direct_write;
 	void *xdp_kfunc;
 	bool is_rdonly;
 
@@ -21827,16 +21824,10 @@ static void specialize_kfunc(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		return;
 
 	if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) {
-		seen_direct_write = env->seen_direct_write;
 		is_rdonly = !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, BPF_WRITE);
 
 		if (is_rdonly)
 			*addr = (unsigned long)bpf_dynptr_from_skb_rdonly;
-
-		/* restore env->seen_direct_write to its original value, since
-		 * may_access_direct_pkt_data mutates it
-		 */
-		env->seen_direct_write = seen_direct_write;
 	}
 
 	if (func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_set_dentry_xattr] &&

-- 
2.43.0