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Message-ID: <38dd70d77f8207395206564063b0a1a07dd1c6e7.camel@linux.dev>
Date: Mon, 05 Jan 2026 21:22:54 +0800
From: KaFai Wan <kafai.wan@...ux.dev>
To: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>,
ast@...nel.org, daniel@...earbox.net, andrii@...nel.org,
martin.lau@...ux.dev, eddyz87@...il.com, song@...nel.org,
yonghong.song@...ux.dev, john.fastabend@...il.com, kpsingh@...nel.org,
sdf@...ichev.me, haoluo@...gle.com, jolsa@...nel.org, davem@...emloft.net,
edumazet@...gle.com, kuba@...nel.org, pabeni@...hat.com, horms@...nel.org,
hawk@...nel.org, shuah@...nel.org, aleksander.lobakin@...el.com,
bpf@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Yinhao Hu <dddddd@...t.edu.cn>, Kaiyan Mei <M202472210@...t.edu.cn>,
Dongliang Mu <dzm91@...t.edu.cn>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf, test_run: Fix user-memory-access
vulnerability for LIVE_FRAMES
On Mon, 2026-01-05 at 11:46 +0100, Toke Høiland-Jørgensen wrote:
> KaFai Wan <kafai.wan@...ux.dev> writes:
>
> > This fix reverts to the original version and ensures data_hard_start
> > correctly points to the xdp_frame structure, eliminating the security
> > risk.
>
> This is wrong. We should just be checking the meta_len on input to
> account for the size of xdp_frame. I'll send a patch.
Current version the actual limit of the max input meta_len for live frames is
XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM - sizeof(struct xdp_frame), not XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM.
The original version not set xdp_buff->data_hard_start with xdp_frame,
I set it with the correct position by adding the headroom, so there is no need
for user to reduce the max input meta_len.
This patch is failed with the xdp_do_redirect test, I'll fix and send v2 if
you're ok with that.
>
> -Toke
>
--
Thanks,
KaFai
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