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Message-ID: <tencent_8D33CB9E2A1B8D4B511BB0250FBAA8BB8708@qq.com>
Date: Wed,  7 Jan 2026 17:39:36 +0800
From: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@...com>
To: syzbot+2c29addf92581b410079@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: andrii@...nel.org,
	ast@...nel.org,
	bpf@...r.kernel.org,
	daniel@...earbox.net,
	eddyz87@...il.com,
	haoluo@...gle.com,
	john.fastabend@...il.com,
	jolsa@...nel.org,
	kpsingh@...nel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	martin.lau@...ux.dev,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	sdf@...ichev.me,
	song@...nel.org,
	syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com,
	yonghong.song@...ux.dev
Subject: [PATCH] bpf: Format string can't be empty

The user constructed a BPF program containing a bpf_snprintf() call.
The fmt parameter passed to bpf_snprintf() was not assigned a value;
it only executed the BPF_MAP_FREEZE command to freeze the fmt string.
Furthermore, when bpf_check() executed check_reg_const_str() and
check_bpf_snprintf_call() to check the fmt input parameter of the
user-constructed BPF program's bpf_snprintf() call, strnchr() only
checked if fmt was a null-terminated string. This led the BPF verifier
to incorrectly assume the constant format string was valid.
When the BPF program was actually executed, the out-of-bounds (OOB)
issue reported by syzbot occurred [1].

This issue is strongly related to bpf_snprintf(), therefore adding a
check for an empty format string in check_bpf_snprintf_call() would
be beneficial. Since it calls bpf_bprintf_prepare(), only adding a
check on the result of strnchr() is needed to prevent the case where
the format string is empty.

[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strnchr+0x5e/0x80 lib/string.c:405
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888029e093b0 by task ksoftirqd/1/23
Call Trace:
 strnchr+0x5e/0x80 lib/string.c:405
 bpf_bprintf_prepare+0x167/0x13d0 kernel/bpf/helpers.c:829
 ____bpf_snprintf kernel/bpf/helpers.c:1065 [inline]
 bpf_snprintf+0xd3/0x1b0 kernel/bpf/helpers.c:1049

Allocated by task 6022:
 __bpf_map_area_alloc kernel/bpf/syscall.c:395 [inline]
 bpf_map_area_alloc+0x64/0x180 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:408
 insn_array_alloc+0x52/0x140 kernel/bpf/bpf_insn_array.c:49
 map_create+0xafd/0x16a0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1514

The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
 allocated 944-byte region [ffff888029e09000, ffff888029e093b0)

Fixes: d9c9e4db186a ("bpf: Factorize bpf_trace_printk and bpf_seq_printf")
Reported-by: syzbot+2c29addf92581b410079@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2c29addf92581b410079
Tested-by: syzbot+2c29addf92581b410079@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@...com>
---
 kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
index db72b96f9c8c..88da2d0e634c 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ int bpf_bprintf_prepare(const char *fmt, u32 fmt_size, const u64 *raw_args,
 	char fmt_ptype, cur_ip[16], ip_spec[] = "%pXX";
 
 	fmt_end = strnchr(fmt, fmt_size, 0);
-	if (!fmt_end)
+	if (!fmt_end || fmt_end == fmt)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	fmt_size = fmt_end - fmt;
 
-- 
2.43.0


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