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Message-ID: <20260129153217.35d29be1@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2026 15:32:17 -0800
From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
To: Marc Sune <marcdevel@...il.com>
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com, pabeni@...hat.com,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, dborkman@...nel.org, vadim.fedorenko@...ux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH net v2 0/4] discard ARP/NDP b/mcast/null announce
(poison)
On Thu, 29 Jan 2026 19:39:59 +0100 Marc Sune wrote:
> > > This patchset only modifies the behaviour of the neighbouring subsystem
> > > when processing network packets. Static entries can still be added with
> > > mcast/bcast/null MACs.
> >
> > Not a very strong opinion but my intuition would be to target
> > this to net-next. I read it as an improvement to RFC compliance
> > more than a solution.
>
> The main driver for this patchset is to remove the attack vectors
> described in Note 1 and Note 2 of Patch 1/4 (in the cover letter of
> RFC v1), not so much being RFC compliant. They are arguably low risk,
> but I would think there is value in having them on all stable
> versions. I originally targeted net and didn't add Fixes as I think
> these sanity checks have never been there.
>
> Let me know if you prefer v3 to target net-next instead.
Nobody else chiming in to disagree with me so if it's your word against
mine I do prefer net-next :)
No matter what we do an unsecured L2 is not defensible by making tweaks
at the endpoint in the IP protocol stack.
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