phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] Any "large verifiers" on the panel?

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date: Sun, 17 Feb 2013 00:30:23 -0800
From: Jeremi Gosney <epixoip@...dshell.nl>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Any "large verifiers" on the panel?

On 2/16/2013 10:45 PM, Jeffrey Goldberg wrote:
> On 2013-02-16, at 10:34 PM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@...auckland.ac.nz> wrote:
>
>> Jeffrey Goldberg <Jeffrey@...dmark.org> writes:
>>
>>> Basically, it would be really sucky to settle upon a winner and then have
>>> sites and services say, "we won't use that because we can't manage our
>>> verification costs the way we need to."
>> This is why I asked for an asymmetric option for the CFP, alongside the O( n )
>> everywhere for smaller sites we also need an O( 1 ) on the server, O( n ) on
>> the client for larger users, so some sort of trapdoor-function iterated-
>> hashing mechaism perhaps.
> I am neither a cryptographer nor a hacker, so forgive me if this question
> is naive. Any asymmetric scheme will require some secret key to be available to
> the legitimate verifier at verification time (right?). And if so, shouldn't we 
> expect that the same compromises that would get the password hashes would also get
> at that secret?

Correct. You have to assume that if the passwords are compromised, the
encryption key is as well.