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Message-ID: <5121B661.3060208@bindshell.nl>
Date: Sun, 17 Feb 2013 21:04:33 -0800
From: Jeremi Gosney <epixoip@...dshell.nl>
To: Daniel Franke <dfoxfranke@...il.com>
CC: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Any "large verifiers" on the panel?
On 2/17/2013 8:24 PM, Daniel Franke wrote:
> Jeremi Gosney <epixoip@...dshell.nl> writes:
>> SQL injection, remote includes, local includes, and straight RCE flaws
>> are by and large the biggest ways password hashes are compromised. More
>> often than not, these vulnerabilities can be leveraged to view arbitrary
>> files, or in the best case scenario, obtain a shell running under the
>> context of the httpd or webapp.
> If the attacker can obtain a shell under the same uid as the webapp
> process and go undetected for a while, then he can ptrace the webapp and
> see the passwords as they're being passed into the hashing function.
It does not work this way anymore. At least not on modern Linux
distributions that enable the Yama LSM, which I'm pretty sure all
distributers started doing ~ 3 years back.
I believe FreeBSD also limits ptrace functionality through MAC policies,
but I am unsure of whether it is disabled by default.
I cannot speak to other operating systems.
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