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Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2013 09:50:59 -0500 (CDT)
From: Steve Thomas <steve@...tu.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Let's not degenerate when if the PRF is too narrow for
 desired output

> On April 17, 2013 at 7:25 AM Matthew Green <matthewdgreen@...il.com> wrote:
>
>
> I think this statement could be relaxed a bit, but I also agree that overall
> computational cost should be dominated by the work factor specified as input
> to the function -- it should not depend strongly (i.e., linearly) on output
> length.
>
> This would be a real issue in an authentication system where the defender was
> generating long 'hashes' but an attacker could save cycles by only computing a
> shorter prefix to test against.
>

The problem is that people don't know that PBKDF2 is for generating keys and not
password hashes. Even Microsoft gets this wrong:
http://hashcat.net/forum/thread-1752-post-9981.html#pid9981

The correct way to use PBKDF as a password hash:
* hash = Encrypt(PBKDF2(pw, salt, iterations, keySize), staticOrKnownText) //
Encrypt(key, message)
* hash = MAC(PBKDF2(pw, salt, iterations, keySize), staticOrKnownText) //
MAC(key, message)
* hash = PBKDF1(pw, salt, iterations, keySize) // I don't think this is an
approved use of PBKDF1, but I see nothing wrong with it. I.E. don't use this.
not:
* hash = PBKDF2(pw, salt, iterations, keySize)

In the case with AgileBits, they are generating a key and an IV and only the key
is needed to verify the padding. This would have been a non-issue if AgileBits
took the first 128 bit as the IV and the second 128 bits as the key. Although
with access to SIMD instructions, such as SSE2, there is little to no difference
in time between PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(pw, salt, iterations, 128) and
PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(pw, salt, iterations, 256).


> By the way, this would seem to be an issue for scrypt as well, since it uses
> PBKDF2 for the final generation.
>

No this is not a problem with scrypt because it uses an iteration of 1 with
PBKDF2. This is after the hard part is done which takes a few milliseconds. So
unless you are storing a several kilobyte hash there is almost no difference in
time.


> We should discuss whether we want this to be a criteria for PHC.
>

This is already in a sense is a requirement, but this is impossible to follow
perfectly. With all hash functions you can do an early exit to skip a couple
steps, but with properly iterated hashes this saves an almost negligible amount
of time. Also early exit is not allowed by the defender since this leaks info
about the stored hash.
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