phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] further limitation: not writing secret to memory

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Message-ID: <599757112.20130918204841@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2013 20:48:41 +0200
From: Krisztián Pintér <pinterkr@...il.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] further limitation: not writing secret to memory

Steve Thomas (at Wednesday, September 18, 2013, 7:58:25 PM):

>     This would not work as you can simply xor two values together
> to remove r. (m0 + r) + (m1 + r) = m0 + m1  

busted

> I really don't see the point in all of this. Since if the
> attacker is on the authentication box

offline. consider a stolen laptop. not necessarily able to tamper the running system. this IS a different attack model, and makes sense.

> I'm pretty sure page locked memory [...] never gets written to swap.

on a windows box, there are multiple ways of telling the OS not to swap a memory block. but neither of those guarantees anything. i'm not a linux guy, but as i'm informed, you can't do that ony linux either.