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Date: Fri, 10 Jan 2014 17:34:41 +0100
From: Christian Forler <christian.forler@...-weimar.de>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] What's your favorite entry so far, and why?

On 09.01.2014 14:10, Bill Cox wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 9, 2014 at 4:56 AM, Christian Forler

[ 1GB vs 10 MB ]

> That's why Catena's Sever Relief idea makes sense.  The key stretching
> should be matched to the machine it's running on.  For my laptop, I
> would prefer 2GB.  For my phone, maybe 256MB.  On a loaded server, maybe
> 10MB is all it can afford.
> 
>     We designed Catena to run smoothly on (almost) any modern computer
>     without causing extra pain for regular users/admins.
> 
> 
> That's awesome, but I think we should not develop for the lowest common
> denominator machine.  Scrypt measures the available RAM and CPU speed
> and picks parameters automatically.  For client-side KDF, I think this
> is a good way to go.

Yes. there is a significant amount of hosts were this approach works ver
well. You are free to adjust Catena-n cost parameters as well.


> For KDF that runs on my machine, I want a good fraction of a second of
> KDF with maximum memory usage.  I think server admins will appreciate a
> password protection framework that's easy to use, flexible, and stays
> out of their way if needed.  I think the Catena framework sounds like
> the right approach.  My only  gripe is that if I'm going to spend 1
> second on a KDF, I'm going to want to hash a lot of memory.  Script's
> speed (about 1/4 GB/second on my development machine) should be
> considered the lower bound on acceptable efficiency, IMO.

"Of course it is not secure, but look how fast it is!" :-)


> There is no reason Catena has to run slowly, and I haven't looked at the
> code, so I don't know what efficiency changes have been made.  For
> example, you could run with two rows small enough to fit in L1 cache,
> and then do a ton of rows, followed by a final round that hashes all
> memory from all rows 4KB at a time.

Nope. We are not interested that Catena can not efficiently computed
without tones of  L1 and L2 cache misses since this also effects
the performance of GPU implementations.


> You could replace memory locations in Catena's rows with blocks of
> memory of significant size, and have randomized edges between blocks
> instead of a single edge between nodes.

Hmm...

>  You also could also use an ultra-fast non-cryptographic hash in the
> inner loop.

Maybe we can reduce the demands on the inner-loop hash function without
getting into (theoretical) trouble.


>  You also could modify the graph a bit so that the inner
> loop could process a user-selectable number of hashes in parallel. 

> That alone makes a 3X speed difference on my development machine.  Adding
> multiple threads is as simple as running N copies at the same time, and
> you could hash memory between them as a post-process to force cheaters
> to keep it all.

You have some nice ideas which will be discussed in the near future. I
will keep you up-to-date.


Best regards,
Christian














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