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Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2014 12:59:26 -0800 (PST)
From: "Stephen Touset" <stephen@...set.org>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Cc: "discussions" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] Native server relief support for password hashing in
 browsers

My original idea behind the blakerypt session key was to defeat cache analysis.


However, the Catena guys seemingly have a much better approach than mine, which doesn't require the hash to be keyed, so I have effectively bowed out of the competition to make room for the professionals here who know what they are doing. :)
-- 
Stephen Touset
stephen@...set.org

On Sat, Jan 18, 2014 at 12:15 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
wrote:

> On Sat, Jan 18, 2014 at 12:03 PM, Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com> wrote:
>> On Sat, Jan 18, 2014 at 2:44 PM, Tony Arcieri <bascule@...il.com> wrote:
>>> I suggested to Brendan Eich (via Twitter) that browsers directly implement
>>> server relief for password hashing functions:
>>>
>>> https://twitter.com/BrendanEich/status/424282367335731201
>>>
>>> I think it'd be pretty cool if that happened!
>>
>> I agree.  One thing I haven't figured out is how to do Blakerypt style
>> session key protection with server relief.  A Blakerypt session key is
>> a secret associated with the password which is decrypted with a secret
>> master key on the server.  So long as it remains a secret, off-line
>> brute-force attacks become impractical.  It's an awesome extra level
>> of protection for servers that implement it.  The problem is how can
>> we keep the session key secret if we broadcast it to clients?  I
>> suspect this is solvable...
>>
> What protection does this offer above the following simple scheme:
> Choose a random key k.  Store it in an HSM.
> Server stores, for each user, (username, salt (etc), E_k(password
> hash)).  HSM has a primitive that takes E_k(password hash) and the
> hash and tells you whether they match.
> For even more fun, an HSM instead implement the server end of SRP or
> another augmented PAKE given E_k(the verifier).  That verifier could
> be based on an expensive hashed version of the password.
> Of course, once you have HSMs in the picture, one wonders whether
> expensive hashing is needed at all.
> --Andy
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