phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] Question about saturating the memory bandwidth

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Message-ID: <52DA498D.10803@bindshell.nl>
Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2014 01:29:49 -0800
From: Jeremi Gosney <epixoip@...dshell.nl>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Question about saturating the memory bandwidth

On 1/18/2014 12:40 AM, Peter Maxwell wrote:
> Saturating the memory bandwidth will not be practical - or even nearly
> so - for the majority of use-cases.
[...]
> we'll be lucky to convince folk to use anything more than a
> salted-hash let alone something that will hog all their processor
> cores and memory for each login attempt (whether that attempt is valid
> or not).

Agree completely. We can be memory hard without saturating the memory
bus. bcrypt is a good (but imperfect) example of how we can be memory
hard while using very little RAM.