phc-discussions - RE: [PHC] Native server relief support for password hashing in browsers

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Message-ID: <009801cf1542$6012e6b0$2038b410$@acm.org>
Date: Sun, 19 Jan 2014 10:15:02 -0800
From: "Dennis E. Hamilton" <dennis.hamilton@....org>
To: <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>,
	'Krisztián Pintér' <pinterkr@...il.com>
Subject: RE: [PHC] Native server relief support for password hashing in browsers

Precisely.

-----Original Message-----
From: Krisztián Pintér [mailto:pinterkr@...il.com] 
Sent: Sunday, January 19, 2014 10:07
To: Dennis E. Hamilton
Cc: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Native server relief support for password hashing in browsers


Dennis E. Hamilton (at Sunday, January 19, 2014, 6:56:31 PM):

>  2. Under the given PHC threat scenario, it is assumed that K is
> disclosed and the work factor for discovering a k0 (or k0'
> collision) value by off-line attack is daunting enough and of
> limited value (i.e., that value is not reused in any other setting).
> That work factor applies to H, not the PBKDF.

brute forcing passwords is feasible because of the typical low entropy
of passwords. brute forcing a true 128 bit space is unfeasible, and
will be unfeasible for quite some time. brute forcing a 256 bit space
is unimaginable.