phc-discussions - Re: Initial multiply-compute-hardened Catena-3 benchmark

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Message-ID: <CAOLP8p7D8-B1uK+TpWbTEj_fsokQaXySuLPQn837LwhPP35J=Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2014 17:03:40 -0500
From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: Initial multiply-compute-hardened Catena-3 benchmark

On Thu, Jan 23, 2014 at 2:10 PM, Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com> wrote:
> I've signed in a branch of Catena that replaces the hashing function
> with a simple multiply, OR, and ADD.  I also made it hash blocks of
> 4096 bytes of memory at once rather than 64.  The result runs 13X
> faster, filling 1GB of memory in 1.37 seconds on a single thread.
>
> In comparison, NoelKDF hashes 1GB in 0.42 seconds on 1 thread, or 3.2X
> faster.  However, there's a TMTO attack against NoelKDF that requires
> almost the same runtime, but only uses 0.5GB.  There is no such attack
> against Catena-3, IMO.
>
> Taking that into account, Catena-3 takes only about 40% longer to hash
> the same memory as an attacker optimized version of NoelKDF.  I'm
> leaning towards Catena-3 now, for timing attack resistance, at least
> if we have an option for a fast hash in the inner loop.

I shouldn't do math when I'm tired.  Also, I tuned NoelKDF just a bit,
and it's running 1GB single-thread in .39 seconds, or 75% faster than
my sped-up version of Catena3, taking into account a free-ish 2X
speed-up.  However, NoelKDF was not designed for cache-timing
resistance.  I'm going to put it back the way it was before, when it
was simpler, and read from password dependent addresses from the
beginning.  In that case, I don't need the cheat killer round, and an
attacker cannot easily obtain any free 2X memory reduction, since he
wont know what memory will never be accessed again.  NoelKDF is better
off as a KDF optimized without cache timing attacks in mind.  In that
case, it gets a full 3.5X speed advantage.  It also is resistant to
TMTO.  However, cache timing attacks can defeat not only it's memory
requirement, but also it's runtime.

Bill