lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 20:56:21 +0400
From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Is bandwidth all that counts?

On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 03:01:45AM +0000, Peter Maxwell wrote:
> So essentially, a hardware attacker can:
> 
> - use compute operations much cheaper than defender;

Not in all respects: the latency of some compute operations stays about
the same.  This is why we're doing those multiplies.  They're still
cheaper in terms of how many the attacker can have per chip, but they
may help us tie up attacker's other resources (memory).

> - use memory storage at the roughly the same cost as defender;
> 
> - use memory bandwidth at roughly the same cost per hash operation as the
> defender.
> 
> Have I got that correct?

Mostly.

> From what I understand - and I don't know how far down the road they
> actually are - there are ASICs being produced to do scrypt hashes because
> it's used in Litecoin,

The first generation of them is ~10x slower than GPUs, but they are more
energy-efficient.  Perhaps they will become better with time.

> presumably with the side-effect that these
> appliances can be used for cracking password hashes too.

Hardly.

Bitcoin miners are generally not usable (with any decent efficiency, if
at all) to crack passwords hashed with SHA-256, and Litecoin miners are
_probably_ not usable to crack scrypt with parameters other than
Litecoin's (which are way below what's recommended for use of scrypt as
KDF or password hash).  I would not be surprised if a Litecoin ASIC is
actually tunable to attack scrypt at other parameters, but it'd be slow
(would have to use high TMTO factor, since there's no incentive to waste
die area on putting much memory into such ASICs).

> Is it likely that
> the need for significantly improved memory bandwidth in other contexts -
> for example high-performance computing in the sciences - will drive an
> improvement in technology such that the assumptions on memory bandwidth
> limitations will fail in the near future?

There are already HPC cards with several times higher memory bandwidth
than what's available from server's main CPUs.  It is quite possible
that this gap will be increasing, although the opposite is also possible.
It may make sense for our password hashing schemes to be tunable for
efficient use on such cards, so that they could be used defensively.

It also makes sense to depend on more than just the bandwidth.  This is
why we're introducing those multiply latencies.  This is also why I'm
unhappy with fully cache-timing safe designs' pre-determined memory
access patterns, as they remove the dependency on memory latency (only
depending on the bandwidth, not latency) and on efficient small lookups.

> And as a slight tangential: is it worth candidate algorithms for PHC having
> a tunable to create ever-so-slight changes in computation such that any
> adoption by a crypto currency isn't going to indirectly encourage hardware
> specifically for cracking password hashes to be produced?

We're not seeing such hardware with Bitcoin and Litecoin.  The ASICs
produced so far are just enough to let us see what attack speeds would
be possible, but they're not directly usable - unless and until the
makers of such ASICs deliberately decide to make them dual-use (also
usable for a subset of password cracking attacks), which they might do,
possibly with some impact on mining speeds.

We sort of already have such tunables - e.g., scrypt has 3, and most
PHC candidates will likely have this many or more.  I don't see any
reason to introduce an extra tunable specifically against cryptocurrency
miners.  Whether we do that or not, it'd be up to those miners'
developers to include support for each tunable parameter or not, and
their choice will depend on their incentive vs. cost.  An extra tunable
would not become a magic anti-cryptocurrency-ASIC one just because we
say we intend it for this purpose.  Well, we could make it specifically
costly to implement in an ASIC, or (in other words) to make it much
cheaper to implement specialized versions without support for that
tunable, but that's something we could consider outside of
cryptocurrency context.

Alexander

Powered by blists - more mailing lists