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Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2014 12:11:43 -0500
From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] multiply-hardening (Re: NoelKDF ready for submission)

On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 11:46 AM, Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 11:06:45AM -0500, Bill Cox wrote:
>> In general, I
>> don't think there's a way for the SIMD loop to be as fast as the
>> non-SIMD loop, and this difference will not be seen by an ASIC
>> attacker, so it comes right out of compute-time hardness.
>
> This is about right, but there appear to be ways around it:
>
> 1. If we do 32x32->64, then non-SIMD latency is 4 to 5 cycles (for the
> upper 32 bits of result; the lower 32 bits may be ready in "eax" after 3
> cycles).  The PMULUDQ latency is 3 to 5 cycles - potentially even 1
> cycle better than best CPU's non-SIMD equivalent (for upper 32 bits of
> result).  See GenuineIntel0010676_Harpertown_InstLatX64.txt for where
> PMULUDQ wins over scalar (3 cycles vs. 5 cycles latency).

Awesome.  I'll check out that paper.  I'm currently getting 3 cycle
latency for 32x32->32 plus 1 cycle for the add on Ivy Bridge.  It's
the other stuff, the OR, ADD, and memory I/O that seems to increase
the SSE 4.1 latency.  The multiply is 5 cycles, I think.

In the original NoelKDF that ran in .35 seconds with 2 threads hashing
2GB, I found the generated code did everything with SSE *except* the
multiply, with it did with an imulq in parallel.  That was pretty
cool, and explains why that particular hash function was so fast.

> 2. We may do a non-SIMD chain for latency hardening in parallel with a
> bunch of SIMD chains optimized for throughput (to use the multipliers'
> die area optimally and not leave room for attacker to share most of the
> multipliers between cores).  Then even PMULLD on Haswell will be fine
> (not on Avoton, though, where it's also much lower throughput, compared
> to e.g. PMULUDQ).  By having multiple chains work "in parallel" I mean
> use of interleaved instructions (ALU intermixed with SIMD).  Their
> results would need to be mixed together once in a while, such as after
> each block.
>
> Also, accessing memory via SIMD instructions improves bandwidth, and
> this can only be done with no overhead if the computation is SIMD.
>
> Alexander

I don't know if it's worth it to worry about an attacker's die area,
except for RAM if we force him to use cache.  For example, my
hypothetical $3 chip with an awesome GDDR5 port likely will have
100-ish pins.  Assuming a 50u pad pitch, a pad limited die will have a
usable core area of 1.5mm^2.  Even at $0.20/mm^2, that's only $0.30
for the core, and maybe $1.00 with pad ring, scribe line, test and
cheap packaging.  $3 gives me a reasonable margin.  How much
configurable ALU logic can I fit in 1.5mm^2?  Probably more than a
single GDDR5 port can handle.  If area begins to be an issue, I can
pipeline everything and increase the throughput.

Put another way, an attacker will pay a ton more for his electricity
than for his die area over time, except for area devoted to RAM.
Maybe we can take power into account and make it expensive for him.

Bill

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