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Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2014 21:52:36 +0400
From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] multiply-hardening (Re: NoelKDF ready for submission)

On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 12:21:40PM -0500, Bill Cox wrote:
> I was under the impression that bcrypt was difficult for a GPU due to
> it's memory size requirement, and that soon with increased L1 cache
> sizes, bcrypt may be fast to hash on GPUS.  Some paper I read said so,
> and papers are never wrong :-)

It's local memory (in OpenCL parlance) rather than L1 cache, but yes -
having more of it will enable more bcrypt instances to run in parallel,
helping to put more execution units to use and helping hide latencies.

bcrypt uses only 4 KB.  We're lucky that right now, with this specific
unpredictable access pattern, it's (barely) sufficient to defeat GPUs.
We should improve upon that by allowing for scaling that portion up to
larger sizes while maintaining the access pattern.

> What is it about bcrypt's memory access pattern that is hard for GPUs?

Very frequent unpredictable 4-byte lookups.  If they go to external
memory, they'd incur very high latency and fetch entire cache lines
(wasteful).  Even with local memory, latency is pretty high (compared to
L1 cache on CPU).  Normally, the latency would be hidden by having more
instances run in parallel, but there's currently not enough local memory
to run even the bare minimum needed to keep all execution units in use
at all (thus, many are 100% idle).  So it's a combination of factors.

> What I currently do for GPUs is to allow for memory sizes as low as
> 1MB,

How is this something you do "for GPUs"?

> with block sizes as low as 4 bytes, and if that hashes to
> quickly, there is a repetition factor that increases the inner loop
> calculations to run as long as you like.

Oh, so you support block sizes this small.  Good.  What's not so good,
though, is that such small block sizes at total sizes exceeding CPUs' L1
cache are slow on CPU - you have that same problem with fetching entire
cache lines, etc.  They're only good for L1 cache.

> I guess my 1MB may be too
> coarse, but below 1MB just seems like giving up on memory hardness.

Yes, giving up on memory hardness for ASICs - but not on let's say local
memory hardness for current GPUs yet.  There may be use cases where the
defender would want such low settings for other reasons, and it's our
job to provide no-worse-than-bcrypt security at those low settings.

> Is something like this what is required?

Yes, but I think we need at least 2 levels: one is with tiny bcrypt-like
accesses to a block of data that fits in L1 cache on defender's systems,
and the other with larger block-sized accesses.  An easy way to do that
would be to treat each block as the arena for a bcrypt-like algorithm,
and to have that algorithm inside our BlockMix-alike.  However, this is
suboptimal in that an optimal block size in terms of TLB misses is
something like 1 KB, whereas an optimal bcrypt-like arena size is in the
range of 4 KB to 32 KB (currently).  I am playing with 12 KB or 16 KB
for the bcrypt-like S-boxes, which lets me run two threads/core and
still fit in 32 KB L1 cache, along with the current ~1 KB'ish blocks.

Alexander

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