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Message-ID: <001901cf3a57$d8f4a070$8adde150$@acm.org>
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2014 14:51:57 -0800
From: "Dennis E. Hamilton" <dennis.hamilton@....org>
To: <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: RE: [PHC] Are password trailing 0's a problem?
Whoa!
I missed that the first time.
CodesInChaos is sort of saying that HMAC-SHA1 is not very collision resistant.
Of course, all that happened was computation of SHA1 on 65-byte printable inputs until the result is a 20-byte output that has only the codes for printable ASCII characters. These two would have the same HMAC result when used as a key.
I don't think that has any impact on PBKDF2 as a password-based key derivation, where collisions are not so much of a problem so long as finding any key, whether or not the one used originally, is seriously difficult. That is, it's still a long way from demonstrating collisions to being able to find a particular one.
It does make pre-hashing an attractive precaution though.
- Dennis
-----Original Message-----
From: CodesInChaos [mailto:codesinchaos@...il.com]
Sent: Friday, March 7, 2014 08:50
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Are password trailing 0's a problem?
[ ... ]
But it means that there are trivial collisions and even second
pre-images (add a 0 byte at the end, if the original key was shorter
than the block size, this won't have any effect).
As an example with nice printable characters in both passwords:
`plnlrtfpijpuhqylxbgqiiyipieyxvfsavzgxbbcfusqkozwpngsyejqlmjsytrmd`
and `eBkXQTfuBqp'cTcar&g*` have the same PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA1 hash (no
matter the salt or the number of iterations).
I found those with a CPU and unoptimized code. One of our GPU hashing
friends could easily find a similar pair for PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256.
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