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Message-ID: <20140328231328.GA29617@openwall.com>
Date: Sat, 29 Mar 2014 03:13:28 +0400
From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Scrypt can have highest time*average memory cost

On Sat, Mar 29, 2014 at 01:01:36AM +0400, Solar Designer wrote:
> pow2
> t       AT      AT/t    ATnorm
> 1.00    0.33    0.333   1.333
> 1.05    0.38    0.365   1.391
> 1.10    0.43    0.394   1.433
> ...
> 1.25    0.58    0.467   1.493
> 1.30    0.63    0.487   1.499
> 1.35    0.68    0.506   1.500 <==
> 1.40    0.73    0.524   1.497
> 1.45    0.78    0.540   1.490

More curious numbers: yescrypt reaches scrypt's AT at 5/3*N:

1.65    0.98    0.596   1.445
1.70    1.03    0.608   1.430

When it does, its ATnorm efficiency is at exactly 96% of max:

1.5/(5/4)^2 = 0.96

In other words, it is (very slightly) more optimal to stop at 4/3*N with
increased N (by a factor of 5/4 to maintain constant time) than to
proceed to 5/3*N.

> 1.90    1.23    0.649   1.367
> 1.95    1.28    0.658   1.350
> 2.00    1.33    0.667   1.333
> 2.05    1.38    0.675   1.317
> 2.10    1.43    0.683   1.300

yescrypt's AT at 4/3*N is reached by scrypt at 5/3*N:

1.66    0.66    0.398   0.958
1.67    0.67    0.401   0.961

This is also 96% of what's optimal (for scrypt this time).

In terms of API, I am thinking of making t_cost = 0 request 4/3*N for
yescrypt native modes (optimal) and 5/3*N for scrypt-like modes (96% of
optimal).  That way, it requests the same AT cost (given the same values
of other parameters) in either case.

Similarly, I am thinking of making t_cost = 1 request 5/3*N for yescrypt
native modes (96% of optimal) and 2*N for scrypt-like modes (optimal).
That way, it also requests the same AT cost (given the same values of
other parameters) in either case.

It is slightly unfortunate that 100% optimal setting will vary between 0
and 1 for these two categories of modes.  But even if chosen wrongly,
it's 96% of optimal, and arguably being inadvertently at only 2/3 of
intended AT cost would be a worse tradeoff.  So I prefer exact match for
AT cost and risk of having "only" 96% efficiency if a wrong one of these
settings is used inadvertently.  It's also convenient to be able to
benchmark these modes at same AT cost by altering only the requested
mode and leaving t_cost intact.

What's I still haven't decided on (and would appreciate advice on) is how
to handle t_cost of 2 and above.  With my decisions already made, we have:

t_cost	anti-TMTO	TMTO-friendly	AT (vs. scrypt)
0	4/3		5/3		2/3
1	5/3		2		1

scrypt
t       AT      AT/t    ATnorm
2.00    1.00    0.500   1.000
2.33    1.33    0.571   0.980
2.50    1.50    0.600   0.960
2.66    1.66    0.624   0.938
3.00    2.00    0.667   0.889
3.33    2.33    0.700   0.840
3.50    2.50    0.714   0.816
3.66    2.66    0.727   0.794
4.00    3.00    0.750   0.750
4.33    3.33    0.769   0.710
4.50    3.50    0.778   0.691
4.66    3.66    0.785   0.674
5.00    4.00    0.800   0.640

pow2
t       AT      AT/t    ATnorm
2.00    1.33    0.667   1.333
2.17    1.50    0.693   1.277
2.33    1.66    0.714   1.226
2.50    1.83    0.733   1.173
2.67    2.00    0.750   1.124
3.00    2.33    0.778   1.037
3.17    2.50    0.790   0.996
3.33    2.66    0.800   0.961
3.50    2.83    0.810   0.925
3.67    3.00    0.818   0.892
4.00    3.33    0.833   0.833
4.17    3.50    0.840   0.806
4.33    3.66    0.846   0.782
4.50    3.83    0.852   0.757
4.67    4.00    0.857   0.734
5.00    4.33    0.867   0.693

Given these numbers, how to assign further t_cost values, such that the
effect on running time matches people's expectations and is convenient,
and preferably such that we continue to match AT cost for same t_cost
regardless of which of the two categories of modes is enabled, and also
such that the t_cost to smix2 iteration count translation is described
by a simple formula (or two of them for the two categories of modes),
not by a table.

ATnorm efficiency is no longer as important for t_cost > 1 because those
values are intended specifically to spend more time without spending
more memory, so further deviation from what would be optimal given
unlimited memory is on purpose.

... Hmm, maybe trying to match AT cost for TMTO-friendly modes makes
little sense, because in scrypt (if both loops are considered) the AT
cost can be reduced by up to a factor of 4 when TMTO is made use of.
Given this lack of precision, trying to match non-TMTO costs exactly
makes a lot less sense than it appeared to at first.

Given this additional consideration, should we simply use? -

t_cost	t	AT anti-TMTO	base AT TMTO-friendly
0	4/3	2/3 (100%)	1/3 (75%)
1	5/3	1 (96%)		2/3 (96%)
2	2	4/3 (89%)	1 (100%)

... but then it's weird to have to emphasize in the documentation that
optimal t_cost for some modes is 0 and for some others is 2.  The 100%
vs. 75% difference is not negligible.

Given all of the above, maybe it's better to match on efficiency: have a
common t_cost achieve 100% ATnorm efficiency for both kinds of modes?

t_cost	t anti-TMTO	t TMTO-friend	AT (vs. scrypt not incl. TMTO)
0	1 (89%)		5/3 (96%)	1/3	2/3
1	4/3 (100%)	2 (100%)	2/3	1
2	2 (89%)		3 (89%)		4/3	2
3	3 (69%)		4 (75%)		7/3	3

Actually, I like this one.  0 and 1 are special, the rest are trivially
computed from t_cost.

For t_cost=0 and anti-TMTO, maybe t very slightly higher than 1.0 should
be preferred, like 13/12 for ATnorm half way between 4/3 (which it is
at t=1.0) and 1.5 (max).  Otherwise the last few elements of V are
almost certainly never read back.

I'll continue to think about this, but I thought I'd run this by the
list as well.

Thanks,

Alexander

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