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Message-ID: <1105779457.20140406220114@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 6 Apr 2014 22:01:14 +0200
From: Krisztián Pintér <pinterkr@...il.com>
To: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com>
CC: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Re: Proposed changes to author's code
Bill Cox (at Sunday, April 6, 2014, 9:31:59 PM):
> Also, I want to start recording some data for each entry that will
> help in automated testing. ...
never starve a volunteer of information when he wants to work. this is
the comment i have added to gambit PHS:
/* PHC interface function
* in:
* out - buffer receiving the derived key
* outlen - size of the desired key in bytes
* in - password, treated as raw bytes
* inlen - password length in bytes, 0<=inlen<=151
* salt - 16 byte salt
* saltlen - must be 16
* t_cost - time cost, t_cost>0, t_cost+2 is the number of keccak-f invokations
* m_cost - in 64 bit words. must be odd, and m_cost<=17*t_cost/4
* out:
* retval - always 0
* *out - filled with outlen bytes of key
*
* the derived key is a pseudorandom function of the password and the salt,
* but NOT of the length. calling PHS with the same salt and password, but
* different outlen will result in one key being the prefix of the other.
*
* claimed security level is 128 bits.
*
* IMPLEMENTATION LIMITATIONS
* these limitations exist in this implementation, but not fundamental, and
* can be easily removed.
* outlen: must be at most 168.
* m_cost: an array of uint64[m_cost] will be allocated using new.
*/
recommended parameters:
t_cost:
14k for 10ms-ish
140k for 100ms-ish
1.4m for 1s-ish
these are optimized keccak numbers, not the barely optimized version
included in the submission. it is approx 1/4 as fast.
m_cost can be chosen independently with the given maximum limitation.
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