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Message-ID: <CAOLP8p7OjrDw4gtoiEc7r9cXM+Udm+uGNtR2zmXTWtnRx+FAOA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2014 18:09:34 -0400
From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: Lyra2 initial review
On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 2:32 PM, Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com> wrote:
> I think there may be a bug in sse/Sponge.c. If not, at a comment
> explaining how this works is in order. Here's the Blake2b implementation:
>
> static inline void blake2bLyraSSE(__m128i *v){
> __m128i t0, t1;
>
> ROUND(0);
> ROUND(1);
> ROUND(2);
> ROUND(3);
> ROUND(4);
> ROUND(5);
> ROUND(6);
> ROUND(7);
> ROUND(8);
> ROUND(9);
> ROUND(10);
> ROUND(11);
> }
>
> Here's the ROUND definition:
>
> #define ROUND(r) \
> G1(v[0],v[2],v[4],v[6],v[1],v[3],v[5],v[7]); \
> G2(v[0],v[2],v[4],v[6],v[1],v[3],v[5],v[7]); \
> DIAGONALIZE(v[0],v[2],v[4],v[6],v[1],v[3],v[5],v[7]); \
> G1(v[0],v[2],v[4],v[6],v[1],v[3],v[5],v[7]); \
> G2(v[0],v[2],v[4],v[6],v[1],v[3],v[5],v[7]); \
> UNDIAGONALIZE(v[0],v[2],v[4],v[6],v[1],v[3],v[5],v[7]);
> ROUND_LYRA(11);
> }
>
> Macros can be really weird, but it looks to me like ROUND(r) is not a
> function of r. This might cause the SSE version to have an insecure PRK.
> However, it generates the same hash result as the reference version. Is
> this macro really doing a proper Blake2b round, or is this some altered
> version?
>
>
I dug into this. It's cool, and shows that the Lyra2 team:
a) Isn't afraid to muck with the internals of Blake2b
b) Knows a lot more about Blake2b than me!
The macro ROUND does not in Lyra2's version depend on r. This corresponds
to running Blake2b while compressing all 0's. When compressing 0's, all
the Blake2b rounds do the same thing, so you can simplify the code and get
rid of the r variable.
I was concerned that squeeze might reveal all the state bits, making it
simple for an attacker to predict future bits as more are squeezed.
Lyra2's sponge has a 1024 bit state, the same that is hashed in rounds of
Blake2b. Lyra2 squeezes only 768 bits before applying 12 rounds of
Blake2b's compression G function with 0's for input. Thus, an attacker is
missing 256 bits of the internal state each time, and likely cannot make
any predictions about what will come out to the sponge next. I was
wondering why Lyra2's block size is 96 bytes while Blake2b hashes 128 bytes
of state in it's rounds. I think this may be the reason.
Lyra2's version of Blake2b skips the initialization from IV and two
variables called f and t. It also skips compressing the state down to 512
bits at the end by XORing the upper half onto the lower half. I assume
they understand what's going on in Blake2b well enough to make these
choices confidently. I'll need to have the rationale explained to me.
Bill
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