phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] on timing attacks

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Message-ID: <20140501123511.GA25532@openwall.com>
Date: Thu, 1 May 2014 16:35:11 +0400
From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] on timing attacks

On Thu, May 01, 2014 at 11:15:45AM +0200, Kriszti?n Pint?r wrote:
> 
> Solar Designer (at Thursday, May 1, 2014, 6:45:07 AM):
> >> granted, this attack is largely thwarted by secret salt. however, in
> >> some situations, for example in case of server relief, the salt might
> >> be available to the attacker, while the password hash is not.
> 
> > However, note that in case of "full" server relief there would be no
> > secret-dependent memory lookups on the server (there would be only a
> > quick last step, like HMAC), so that case doesn't fit your scenario.
> 
> however, the attack becomes possible on the client.

That's true.

Alexander