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Message-ID: <CALCETrWmCK-xRjMFtHRg4kSSz3m6N2MDSeOyv7NiJkz5xO1hSQ@mail.gmail.com> Date: Mon, 26 May 2014 17:59:42 -0700 From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> To: discussions <discussions@...sword-hashing.net> Subject: Re: [PHC] Re: [Cryptography] The proper way to hash password files On Mon, May 26, 2014 at 5:51 PM, Peregrine <peregrinebf@...il.com> wrote: > Of course, one can simply use an HMAC construction with any normal password > hashing function. If you have that in a dedicated hardware chip then you may > gain security, otherwise one should assume that any attack capable of > getting the hashed-password database is capable of getting any other secret > data, like private keys. Some of the submissions explicitly support keyed > password hashing, and with others any secure HMAC scheme should work. Using > a strong password hashing scheme with a key protects weak passwords, and > protects strong passwords even if the key is somehow leaked. I think it's sad that, even on a crypto list, people still talk about new uses of HMAC (that's a Hash-based Message Authentication Code) for things that require properties beyond what a MAC provides and do not require message authentication. In this particular case, using HMAC-fancy-password-hash is extra silly, because HMAC invokes the hash *twice*. I agree that there's some value in using a keyed password hashing function, and similar benefits can probably be obtained with a simple composition of a password hash with a keyed PRF or even just a simple encrypted password hash database. --Andy
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