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Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2014 11:02:06 -0700
From: Dmitry Khovratovich <khovratovich@...il.com>
To: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com>
Cc: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>, ben@...rr.is
Subject: Re: [PHC] Tradeoff cryptanalysis of password hashing schemes

Hi Bill,

1. Yes, the tradeoff should be MT = 16N^2 indeed.

2. Constants like 2^18 do not matter for deciding whether proof is correct
or not. Our attack shows that q^lambda does not appear for q<N^{1/3}. With
some improvement, you can have the penalty O(q^2) for q<N^{0.42} for any
constant lambda. The gap between N^{0.42} and N^{0.5} is interesting to
explore, but it is not so much important.

3. I do not understand what is "lower bound for low q for Catena".

4. I can try to break your primary submission, if you give some explicit
security claims for your fastest secure set of parameters. This applies to
all other candidates, actually.


On Fri, Aug 8, 2014 at 10:13 AM, Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com> wrote:

> First, good work on the pebbling!  I can confirm numbers close to yours
> for Catena on slide 29.  You beat my generic pebbling algorithm for
> Catena-3 by around 10-20% in your benchmarks.  I pebble a 1024 node
> Catena-3 graph using 128 pebbles with 8.7 times more computation, vs your
> 7.4.  I also agree with your second to last equation: for a 1/q fraction of
> memory, you have a  penalty of no more than 4*q for Catena-3, *for small
> q*.  More on that at the end...
>
> I think you're last line is off by 4X.  I agree that an attacker using N/q
> memory has no higher than about a 4*q penalty for small q.  My tests
> confirm your Catena-3 data.  Normally, the time is 4*N computations, so the
> attacker must spend (4*N)*(4*q) = 16*N*q.  Your last equation failed to
> include one of the factors of 4.
>
> After such careful analysis, you should point out that TMTO attackers on
> Catena-3 see almost a 4X overall MT penalty, even at the 1/2 q mark.  That
> compares well vs Script, where TMTO attackers gain a 4X MT *bonus* for high
> q.  IMO, Catena-3 is good enough in TMTO hardness.
>
> The other issue I had with the presentation is slide 24.  You state that
> 1/q memory should imply a penalty of q^lambda.  You seem to think the
> penalty should be strictly greater than q^lambda, but all Catena proved was:
>
>     T >= G^4/(2^18*S^3)
>
> For q < 2^18, this equation provides no useful estimate of the penalty at
> all!  When q aproaches sqrt(N), it is simple to show that the penalty
> increases as q^lambda, because pebbling each sequence of sqrt(N) pebbles
> will require full repebbling of N/2 pebbles on the prior row, and that
> penalty propagates to the prior row for each sqrt(N) that is pebbled, and
> so on.  It is clearly O(q^lambda).  This property is also a lower bound for
> TwoCats, Gambit, and some others.  Unfortunately, it says nothing about
> important TMTO attacks like q == 2 or 4.
>
> So, nice work on the pebbling!  This sort of experimentation is good
> evidence that we're nearing a lower bound for low q for Catena.  For
> example, I'd guess you'd scoff at the possibility that you've left another
> factor of 2 on the table.  That's about how I feel :-)  If you have time,
> try pebbling SkinnyCat :-)  It's an easily analyzed subset of TwoCats.  I
> believe it is weaker than Catena at q=2, but stronger at q=8 and up, but
> that's largely due to my pebbling work.
>
> Bill
>
>
> On Thu, Aug 7, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Dmitry Khovratovich <
> khovratovich@...il.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi Ben,
>>
>> indeed k has to be large enough to be efficient.
>>
>> Your calculations are correct. In fact, you will also have to add 2^3
>> hash calls that actually compute the vertices in the interval to the
>> 3.5x2^6 in precomputations (I will add this to the slides).
>>
>> However, the penalty is computed for the entire Catena. You spend
>> 2^3 hashes to get 2^3 vertices at level 0 - penalty 1
>> (0.5x2^6+2^3) to get 2^3 vertices at level 1 - penalty 5
>> (1.5x2^6+2^3) at level 2 - penalty 13
>> (2.5x2^6+2^3) at level 3 - penalty 21
>> (3.5x2^6+2^3) at level 4 - penalty 29
>>
>> Average penalty is (1+5+13+21+29)/5 = 13.8
>>
>> To get 13.1 I used a more efficient method for levels 1 and 2, which does
>> not do precomputations. Instead, I moved forward stored points at level X-1
>> after they had been used at level X. This gives the penalty 3.375 for level
>> 1 and 11.25 for level 2, so in total you have around 13.1 .
>>
>> Dmitry
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Aug 7, 2014 at 5:15 PM, Ben Harris <ben@...rr.is> wrote:
>>
>>> I'll have to test your pebbling scheme for Catena - but an initial
>>> comment on the time comparisons.
>>>
>>> Catena with lambda=4 and n=20 takes 2^20 storage and 5x2^20 hashes.
>>> Presentation takes Lx2^(n-k) storage. So at k=1 you are using more
>>> memory, and k=2 you are using the same. Need k=3 to use 1/2 the memory.
>>> At k=3 you need 3.5x2^6 to get 2^3 vertices, so 3.5*2^6*2^(20-3) to get
>>> all the vertices for the final row. So 3.5x2^23 to get the last row.
>>>
>>> Catena will take 2^20 to get the final row, so that is a slowdown of
>>> 3.5x2^3 = 28x. You only have 13.1x slowdown?
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7 August 2014 17:15, Ben Harris <ben@...rr.is> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Thanks Dimitry,
>>>>
>>>> Page 26 just needs to be updated then - it says "Consider vertices
>>>> [AB0]... where each letter has k bits" suggesting that A and B are k bits
>>>> each - not that C is k bits.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 7 August 2014 17:10, Dmitry Khovratovich <khovratovich@...il.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Ben,
>>>>>
>>>>> the following points are important:
>>>>>  - A, C, *, 0 are all k-bit values. k<n/3, and for the attack being
>>>>> efficient k>2.
>>>>>  - [**0] takes 2^(n-k) storage per level as you store everything that
>>>>> ends with k zeros.
>>>>>
>>>>> The example in presentation has |A| = |C| = 1, and |B|=2. Such small
>>>>> values are for the ease of understanding, but not for the efficiency. I
>>>>> attach the picture in the higher resolution. The red indices are those
>>>>> precomputed for the next level.
>>>>>
>>>>> Best regards,
>>>>> Dmitry
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, Aug 7, 2014 at 1:19 AM, Ben Harris <ben@...rr.is> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Just getting my head around the Catena one.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Storing [**0] takes 2^2k storage per level? (presentation says
>>>>>> 2^(n-k))
>>>>>> And the [*B*] takes 2^(n-k) storage
>>>>>> So L*2^2k + 2^(n-k) storage all up.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Computing each [*B*] at level 0 takes 2^(n-2k) operations from each
>>>>>> 2^k [*B0]. total 2^(n-k) operations? (presentation says 2^2k)
>>>>>> Computing each [*^B*] at level 1 is more complicated because we don't
>>>>>> always have what we need.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> At level 1, for the A = 1, B = 1, and len(C) = 2 (the example in the
>>>>>> presentation). For the 2^(n-k) = 2^(4-1) = 8 [*^B*] we have
>>>>>> [00 1 0] - h( h([00 0 0] + [1 0 00]) + [0 1 00]) = 2 hashes
>>>>>> [00 1 1] - h([00 1 0] + [1 1 00]) - 1 hash
>>>>>> [01 1 0] - h([01 0 1] + [0 1 10]) - but [01 0 1] is h([01 0 0] + [1 0
>>>>>> 10]) and I don't have [1 0 10] it takes 2 hashes from [1 0 00]
>>>>>> [01 1 1] - 1 hash from previous
>>>>>> [10 1 0] - h([10 0 1] + [0 1 10]) -  again, I don't have [10 0 1]?
>>>>>> [10 1 1] - 1 hash from previous
>>>>>> [11 1 0] - again, we are missing something
>>>>>> [11 1 1] - 1 hash from previous
>>>>>>
>>>>>> These missing dependencies become exponential at level 2+.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So there are three bits I'm getting a bit stuck on:
>>>>>>   - Storage per level
>>>>>>   - Operations for level 0
>>>>>>   - Missing dependencies at level 1
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Maybe I'm just misreading the slides and needed to see the talk?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 7 August 2014 05:10, Marcos Simplicio <mjunior@...c.usp.br> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hi, all.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Very interesting analysis! We noticed the same attack venue
>>>>>>> described in
>>>>>>> slide 47 for Lyra2 some time ago, so we provided and evaluated a
>>>>>>> simple
>>>>>>> fix in the version provided in our website (http://lyra-kdf.net/,
>>>>>>> see
>>>>>>> section 5.1.2.3 of the specification). I'm not sure how the tradeoffs
>>>>>>> table is affected by this fix, but the costs are likely to grow (at
>>>>>>> least that was my impression by crossing your results with our
>>>>>>> preliminary analysis).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> BTW, the document in our website is being continuously updated as new
>>>>>>> tests are performed, so we expect to introduce this and possibly
>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>> tweaks in the corresponding phase of the PHC. We are still evaluating
>>>>>>> the "possible extensions" mentioned in the original submission, for
>>>>>>> example.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> BR,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Marcos.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 06-Aug-14 14:31, Dmitry Khovratovich wrote:
>>>>>>> > Hi all,
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > here is the link to the slides of the talk I have just given at
>>>>>>> > PasswordsCon'14. It investigates time-memory tradeoffs for PHC
>>>>>>> candidates
>>>>>>> > Catena, Lyra2, and Argon, and estimates the energy cost per
>>>>>>> password on an
>>>>>>> > optimal ASIC implementation with full or reduced memory.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > https://www.cryptolux.org/images/5/57/Tradeoffs.pdf
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Additional comment: It is a standard practice in the crypto
>>>>>>> community to
>>>>>>> > give explicit security claims for the recommended parameter sets
>>>>>>> so that
>>>>>>> > cryptanalysts could easily identify the primary targets. Many PHC
>>>>>>> > candidates do not follow this rule by not only missing these
>>>>>>> claims but
>>>>>>> > also concealing the recommended parameters. As a result,
>>>>>>> cryptanalysts like
>>>>>>> > me spend valuable time attacking wrong sets or spreading the
>>>>>>> attention over
>>>>>>> > multiple targets.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>> > Remember: third-party cryptanalysis increases the confidence in
>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>> > design, not decreases it (unless it is badly broken). Analysis of
>>>>>>> a 5%-part
>>>>>>> > of your submission (one of 20 possible parameter sets) is little
>>>>>>> better
>>>>>>> > than no analysis at all. It is also worth mentioning that to make
>>>>>>> fair
>>>>>>> > comparison of candidates, benchmarks and performance discussion in
>>>>>>> general
>>>>>>> > should cover recommended parameter sets only.
>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Best regards,
>>>>> Dmitry Khovratovich
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Best regards,
>> Dmitry Khovratovich
>>
>
>


-- 
Best regards,
Dmitry Khovratovich

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