phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] omegacrypt and timing

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Message-ID: <CAOow+k_EfHY7mgZYu0h9=hW4DtZMS6VpQWzq+eaM3q3bEY=S5w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2014 21:58:15 -0400
From: Peregrine <peregrinebf@...il.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] omegacrypt and timing

We have to be careful about defending only against past practical attacks,
and at incorrectly guessing the reasoning for the relative popularity of
current attacks.

If we had a widely used password hash function that was extremely secure
against offline attacks but leaked enough timing information for attackers
to find the password, then offline attacks would severely decline and
timing attacks would rise. The overall security margin is what matters most.

Also, if an attacker can dump a presumably well-protected file like a
password database then they can at least run some commands on the victim
server. Assuming that they can't get timing data because the best current
attacks are offline is probably a bad assumption.

The more secure one area of a system is made the more incentive there is
for attackers to strike elsewhere.

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