phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] omegacrypt and timing

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Message-ID: <1323935792.20140918084204@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 08:42:04 +0200
From: Krisztián Pintér <pinterkr@...il.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] omegacrypt and timing

epixoip (at Thursday, September 18, 2014, 12:37:49 AM):
> On 9/17/2014 3:18 PM, Krisztián Pintér wrote:

>  No
> threats are excluded from the threat model, but the access vector,
> complexity, probability, and impact are all a factor in determing
> whether a threat actually poses significant risk.

so your point is that the attack i have outlined earlier is
insignificant? can you explain why?

we just heard the news about somebody cracking RSA with listening
sound with a mobile phone. this is not some arcane, esotheric idea.
side channels are here, and very much viable. imagine a dedicated
authentication server. it does nothing but receives a password via the
local network, checks it out, and returns a validity flag. then takes
the next password. the beginning and end of validation is clearly
marked by the network activity. all i need to do is to do traffic
analysis, possibly via EM detection, and i have timing information.
how is that insignificant?

i don't think that you can advertise an authentication system that has
less security than PBKDF2 in one aspect.