phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] Design Rationale and Security Analysis of PHC candidates

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite for Android: free password hash cracker in your pocket

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CA+hr98F=UKfNEV1c6C=osgnjaiMX-Q4DwCAr29s8r4pGW7Ng6w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 13:20:52 +0200
From: Krisztián Pintér <pinterkr@...il.com>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] Design Rationale and Security Analysis of PHC candidates

On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 12:50 PM, Dmitry Khovratovich
<khovratovich@...il.com> wrote:
> The reason is that collision/preimage-resistance/PRF properties of the
> primitive do not translate automatically to the mode of operation.

however in this case the mode of operation is the *same* as in the
underlying primitive. i don't use keccak. gambit *is* keccak. it
directly inherits security properties from the duplex construction.

> in Gambit you did not encode both
> password and salt lengths in the Absorb operation, you'd be in trouble even
> though you use the sponge construction properly.

i defined the salt as fixed length. it is explained in the document,
as well as it is clear from the source code.