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Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 13:20:52 +0200
From: Krisztián Pintér <>
To: "" <>
Subject: Re: [PHC] Design Rationale and Security Analysis of PHC candidates

On Thu, Oct 2, 2014 at 12:50 PM, Dmitry Khovratovich
<> wrote:
> The reason is that collision/preimage-resistance/PRF properties of the
> primitive do not translate automatically to the mode of operation.

however in this case the mode of operation is the *same* as in the
underlying primitive. i don't use keccak. gambit *is* keccak. it
directly inherits security properties from the duplex construction.

> in Gambit you did not encode both
> password and salt lengths in the Absorb operation, you'd be in trouble even
> though you use the sponge construction properly.

i defined the salt as fixed length. it is explained in the document,
as well as it is clear from the source code.

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