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Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2014 05:55:22 -0400
From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] Overview of PHC Candidates and Garbage-Collector Attacks

Hi, Jacob.  This is a nice analysis.  I like that you've read each
algorithm carefully and have gained several insights into each.  That's a
ton of work.  I know how hard it is to read the algorithms and get all the
details about each right.  Of course, the responses will only point out the
mistakes... which I'll now do for TwoCats...

You misread TwoCats.  It is easy to do, which is one reason I wrote
SkinnyCat, which indeed is vulnerable to both GC and WGC attacks.  However,
TwoCats has strong defense against both.  I would argue that TwoCats has
the strongest GC and WGC defense of all the entries.

TwoCats uses Catena's idea for “garlic” to defend against memory-leak
attacks.  If we wind up creating a framework for the eventual winner based
on Catena's framework, I would like to add this garlic-based memory-leak
defense.  It can be applied to any of the memory-hard algorithms.

TwoCats overwrites the derived key (hash32 is the variable name) after
hashing only 1KiB of memory, which it does faster than any other entry.  It
then overwrites this 1KiB of hashed memory by hashing 2KiB of memory over
it, and then overwrites the derived key again.  This should sound familiar
- I copied it from Catena :-)  However, while Catena eventually abandoned
starting with minGarlic == 0 and instead uses minGarlic == maxGarlic,
TwoCats continues this process, applying garlic from 0 to maxGarlic –
overwriteCost before applying maxGarlic.  By default overwriteCost is 6,
meaning I give up 1/32nd run-time, and therefore lose 1/32 memory*time
defense against brute-force guessing attacks.  I felt this was a reasonable
trade-off, in order to gain strong memory leak defense, including GC and
WGC defense.

This not only overwrites hashed memory derived from the key and the derived
key, but also stack variables, which should also be taken into account
(which is yet another idea I learned from Alexander).  By default, TwoCats
also overwrites the password passed to it before hashing any memory.  I
believe TwoCats is the only entry that does this.  Leaving the password in
memory while running a memory-hard hash is obviously worse than being
susceptible to a WGC attack.  I certainly hope the PHC never publishes real
code that does this, even if it is simply reference code.

Here's my analysis of Catena's memory-leak defense (based on the first
submitted version - I haven't read the new revision yet).

By default, Catena runs with minGarlic == maxGarlic == 18.  In this mode,
Catena does not begin to overwrite memory derived from the password until
it has finished filling memory.  During this entire time, H(H(key
material)) is present in memory.  If Catena tries to use too much memory,
this memory might get swapped to disk.  If Catena is running continuously,
as it might on an authentication server, with lambda == 3, there is about a
1 in 4 chance that a cold-boot attack, DMA attack, or forced hibernation,
will reveal H(H(key material)).

In contrast, TwoCats, when repeatedly called to hash even 32MiB of memory,
a cold-boot attack has only about a 1 in 2^15 chance of revealing H(H(key
material)).  IMO, Catena, as well as most other entries, does not do enough
to protect this early sensitive data.  This is how the PHC winner is likely
to be PWN-ed in reality.  This is not a theoretical attack like
cache-timing attacks, but something any script-kiddie can do easily today.

After the winner is announced, assuming we do not require that it be
strengthened to provide better memory leak resistance, here's what I could
do in theory at the next BlackHat (but I wont):

I could set up an authentication server continuously running the PHC
winner, walk up to it with a plug-in peripheral like a firewire device,
perform a DMA attack, and likely walk away with the H(H(key material))
without even having to shut down the server.

I believe memory leak vulnerability is the most significant weakness of
memory-hard password hashing schemes.  Applying early levels of garlic
seems like the best defense, IMO.  A "tweak" to Catena could easily provide
this defense.

Bill

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