phc-discussions - Re: [PHC] PHC finalists announcement

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Message-ID: <CAHOTMVKC-Qqepj0kXBU-PS3fG2mxyr=U0S14ruF2QOxmstBt8A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2014 15:31:09 -0800
From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@...il.com>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] PHC finalists announcement

On Tue, Dec 9, 2014 at 2:32 PM, Krisztián Pintér <pinterkr@...il.com> wrote:

> > - general soundness and simplicity of the algorithm
>
> i'm unclear what this means. i understand simplicity, but not general
> soundness.
>

This was covered in the original call for submissions, which you
paraphrased:

https://password-hashing.net/call.html


   - Cryptographic security: the function should behave as a random
   function (random-looking output, one-way, collision resistant, immune to
   length extension, etc.).
   - Speed-up or other efficiency improvement (e.g., in terms of memory
   usage per password tested) of cracking-optimized implementations (checking
   multiple sets of inputs in parallel, and doing so in a CPU's native code)
   compared to implementations intended for password validation should be
   minimal.
   - Speed-up or other efficiency improvement (e.g., in terms of area-time
   product per password tested) of cracking-optimized ASIC, FPGA, and GPU
   implementations (checking multiple sets of inputs in parallel) compared to
   CPU implementations intended for password validation should be minimal.
   - Resilience to side-channel attacks (timing attacks, leakages, etc.).
   In particular, information should not leak on a password's length.

Your paraphrase:

> Cryptographic security: the function should behave as a random function
> Speed-up or other efficiency improvement (e.g., in terms of memory usage
> per password tested)
> Speed-up or other efficiency improvement (e.g., in terms of area-time
> product per password tested)
> Resilience to side-channel attacks
>

The original criteria were much clearer than your paraphrase. I'm not sure
why you paraphrased the criteria as such. It makes the discussion that much
more confusing.

Then you say:


> the final design criteria is notably different, and contains entirely
> new aspects.


What are these new aspects? I'm confused what you're confused about.

-- 
Tony Arcieri

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