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Message-ID: <CAHOTMVKC-Qqepj0kXBU-PS3fG2mxyr=U0S14ruF2QOxmstBt8A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2014 15:31:09 -0800
From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@...il.com>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] PHC finalists announcement
On Tue, Dec 9, 2014 at 2:32 PM, Krisztián Pintér <pinterkr@...il.com> wrote:
> > - general soundness and simplicity of the algorithm
>
> i'm unclear what this means. i understand simplicity, but not general
> soundness.
>
This was covered in the original call for submissions, which you
paraphrased:
https://password-hashing.net/call.html
- Cryptographic security: the function should behave as a random
function (random-looking output, one-way, collision resistant, immune to
length extension, etc.).
- Speed-up or other efficiency improvement (e.g., in terms of memory
usage per password tested) of cracking-optimized implementations (checking
multiple sets of inputs in parallel, and doing so in a CPU's native code)
compared to implementations intended for password validation should be
minimal.
- Speed-up or other efficiency improvement (e.g., in terms of area-time
product per password tested) of cracking-optimized ASIC, FPGA, and GPU
implementations (checking multiple sets of inputs in parallel) compared to
CPU implementations intended for password validation should be minimal.
- Resilience to side-channel attacks (timing attacks, leakages, etc.).
In particular, information should not leak on a password's length.
Your paraphrase:
> Cryptographic security: the function should behave as a random function
> Speed-up or other efficiency improvement (e.g., in terms of memory usage
> per password tested)
> Speed-up or other efficiency improvement (e.g., in terms of area-time
> product per password tested)
> Resilience to side-channel attacks
>
The original criteria were much clearer than your paraphrase. I'm not sure
why you paraphrased the criteria as such. It makes the discussion that much
more confusing.
Then you say:
> the final design criteria is notably different, and contains entirely
> new aspects.
What are these new aspects? I'm confused what you're confused about.
--
Tony Arcieri
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