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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.11.1412121144440.22319@debian> Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 11:48:49 +0100 (CET) From: Stefan.Lucks@...-weimar.de To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net Subject: Re: [PHC] How important is salting really? On Fri, 12 Dec 2014, Ben Harris wrote: > On 12 December 2014 at 17:53, epixoip <epixoip@...dshell.nl> wrote: > Thus the salt table shrinks with each successful > crack, and the effective speed of the attack increases with each > eliminated salt. > > > A rather confusing way to describe things. If we are attacking all password > hashes, one password at a time (from the most common down). Then each time we > find a match, the pool of hashes decreases and subsequent passwords can be > search faster. Ah, now I see what epixoip means. I don't think, this comes even close to a justification for *not* using salts. > At the moment an attacker can calculate somewhere between 10^10 - 10^15 > SHA256 per dollar in electricity. They can scan a list of 1 million common > passwords for about a thousandth of a cent. If this cost were much higher (>> > $1), then the economics of the attacks would change. > > If there was no salt, then the cost would be drastically lower and the > attacker could start the attack before getting the hashed passwords. Yes, that was the point I was trying to make. So long Stefan ------ I love the taste of Cryptanalysis in the morning! ------ <http://www.uni-weimar.de/cms/medien/mediensicherheit/home.html> --Stefan.Lucks (at) uni-weimar.de, Bauhaus-Universität Weimar, Germany--
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