lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Message-ID: <1638468854.290144.1418456033965.JavaMail.open-xchange@oxuslxltgw11.lxa.perfora.net> Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 01:33:53 -0600 (CST) From: Steve Thomas <steve@...tu.com> To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net Subject: Re: [PHC] How important is salting really? > On December 12, 2014 at 11:19 PM Ben Harris <ben@...rr.is> wrote: > > On 13 December 2014 at 11:00, Steve Thomas <steve@...tu.com > <mailto:steve@...tu.com> > wrote: > > > > > P.S. MD5("deliciously-salty-" || pw) is from an infamous article that > > gets salt > > wrong :). It's near the top of Google when searching for rainbow tables. > > > > Joking aside, if you have a unique "deliciously-salty-", truncate the MD5 to > 24 bits, and implement a good rate limiting system you'd probably have a > pretty secure system. Good enough against online attacks, but not so good that > you are giving up someone's password if you leak hashes. [weak passwords are > still weak, and leaks from multiple sources for the same UID would eventually > give up a password] > Wait, I don't even know why I argued that way. I can't think of one case where a severely truncated hash equals more security. Oh wait does my keyboard have a breathalyzer—nope.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists