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Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 21:00:06 -0600 (CST)
From: Steve Thomas <steve@...tu.com>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] How important is salting really?

> On December 12, 2014 at 6:23 PM Ben Harris <ben@...rr.is> wrote:
>
>
> On 13/12/2014 2:57 am, "Steve Thomas" <steve@...tu.com
> <mailto:steve@...tu.com> > wrote:
> > Cool that part got cleared up. Also that "attack passwords before you get
> > the
> > hash" is only theoretical because you probably don't know the hashing
> > algorithm.
> > Is it MD5(pw), SHA1(pw), MD5(SHA1(pw)), MD5("deliciously-salty-" || pw).
> >
> Have a look at bitcoin brain wallets for a practical attack when a salt isn't
> used. I've not seen if anyone has estimated the size of the lookup tables in
> use in those attacks, but I've tested with some obscure and long passwords and
> they are stolen in a second.
>
> I get your point, but for the same reason 12bit salts are a thing there
> aren't many hash combinations in practice (only based off my experience using
> software, though I think WordPress has a server salt for the passwords like
> your deliciously-salty).
>

I thought about writing a cracker for that but I don't think I'd stay on the
side of legal. Also there's a better one that has a salt. You enter your email
address, name, or some other identifier. Yes, it's not exactly salt since it's
not cryptographic random and the user has to enter it. It uses scrypt and
PBKDF2. Don't know why they do both but it's not SHA256(pw).

Database cost is "3 bytes/password"... well in this case since there are two
possible addresses for each password, it's "6 bytes/password". Assuming you
can do 1,000,000 password to address conversions/second it will take 150 ms per
lookup with 2^40 entries ( I made a calculator for this forever ago
<http://www.tobtu.com/lhtcalc.php?keySpace=1099511627776&pwBits=22&speed=1&hdSpeed=50&hdSeek=8&mphfMagic=2.27&mphfExtraPWBits=0&mphfSpeed=400&efExtraPWBits=1&piExtraPWBits=1&efPrefixBits=38>
). Hm it's
probably much slower than 1 M/s like 50 k/s.

P.S. MD5("deliciously-salty-" || pw) is from an infamous article that gets salt
wrong :). It's near the top of Google when searching for rainbow tables.
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