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Message-ID: <CAOLP8p6dNf_rKYwQu+5xUbK5WKXWjn2sqGUbd12MDEg-ndZ9fw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 31 Jan 2015 16:07:12 -0800
From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] yescrypt pre- and post-hashing
On Sat, Jan 31, 2015 at 3:59 PM, Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com> wrote:
> This was believed to be just a peculiarity with no security impact.
> Well, due to a recent tweet/reminder by Juliano Rizzo, I no longer think
> so. There was real security impact, even if in obscure cases.
>
> Specifically, if a site upgrades from raw SHA-256 to e.g. scrypt hashes
> (by re-hashing passwords as users log in), but does not securely wipe
> all copies of the SHA-256 hashes from all places, then for the (few) 65+
> char passwords those hashes can be used to log in to the service,
> without the attacker ever having to crack the plaintext passwords. This
> was Juliano's original concern.
>
> I came up with two more:
>
Wow... that's frigthening! So, any leaked SHA-256 hash DB of y 65+
characterpassword would be accepted as valid by PBKDF2-SHA256. That's a
rare case, but still a hole we should fill, IMO.
Thanks for coming up with this elegant solution to the problem.
Bill
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