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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.11.1502152105560.29780@debian>
Date: Sun, 15 Feb 2015 21:34:58 +0100 (CET)
From: Stefan.Lucks@...-weimar.de
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] PHC status report
On Sat, 14 Feb 2015, D. J. Bernstein wrote:
> NIST required a "recommended" set of parameters. I recommended a set of
> parameters that heavily prioritized conservativism over speed [...]
With *your* *recommended* sets of parameters, CubeHash was absurdly slow.
I understand, what the NIST saw in CubeHash, and I actually agree with
the decision to keep CubeHash in the secon round of SHA-3. CubeHash was a
cool design!
BTW, it is a pity that you preferred a formal version (meeting the tweaked
security requirements, but absurdly slow) and a recommended version (fast
enough, but badly failing even the tweaked security requirements), rather
than submitting a proper tweak that did address the concerns raised by the
NIST in the first-round report.
> [...] If you're going to accuse NIST of ignoring its own rules then you
> should focus on the rules that they actually published, not the rules
> that you wish they had published instead.
The initial rules required approximately 2^512. Later, the rule was
tweaked to accept 2^480 or more as an approximation for 2^512.
I am sure you can find plenty of lawyers who will credibly argue that
2^480 is a reasonable approximation of 2^512. But good luck with finding
plenty of scientists who agree with calling that an "approximation". ;-)
In any case, the story of CubeHash is off-topic for this list, so I won't
discuss it any more, here. I am willing to discuss my ideas for a CubeHash
tweak with you, the next time we meet in person. ;-)
So long
Stefan
------ I love the taste of Cryptanalysis in the morning! ------
uni-weimar.de/de/medien/professuren/mediensicherheit/people/stefan-lucks
--Stefan.Lucks (at) uni-weimar.de, Bauhaus-Universität Weimar, Germany--
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