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Message-ID: <CANdZDc5vwp-vf7d0SvMC+Eh5-fMKxkHKfyzCLpkeHHSKDAMO5g@mail.gmail.com> Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2015 17:19:12 +0000 From: "Zooko O'Whielacronx" <zookog@...il.com> To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net Subject: Re: [PHC] PHC output specifics The stringprep standard (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3454.txt) was designed to address basically this same issue: that the user intends two strings to be the same, but that the two strings accidentally get a different binary representations from one another. Encoding and normalization are only the first two tips of the iceberg. I don't know if stringprep comes with more baggage than it is worth, but at least it is a standard is written down. We could recommend that implementors specify a stringprep profile to apply to strings before encoding and hashing. Here's an example of an authentication mechanism specifying a stringprep profile: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4505#section-3 It fits on a single page on my screen, and it addresses a lot more tips of the iceberg that implementors otherwise wouldn't have thought of. Regards, Zooko
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