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Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2015 09:30:24 -0700
From: Bill Cox <waywardgeek@...il.com>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: Re: [PHC] Another PHC candidates "mechanical" tests (ROUND2)

On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 8:27 AM, Marcos Simplicio <mjunior@...c.usp.br>
wrote:

>
> >> Or more generic question: what about embedded world?
> >>
> >> PHC seems to be mainly about online services, where you have some big
> >> Intel server hosting behind it but I would like to not forget about
> embedded
> >> systems.
> >
> > You simply scale down the cost settings accordingly.  yescrypt is
> > designed to achieve decent attack resistance even at low settings (of
> > course, I mean decent for those settings), including below 1 MB.
> >
> > Alternatively, there are PHC finalists that are well-suited specifically
> > for such uses - that's Pufferfish and maybe POMELO - but yescrypt has
> > the advantage of being a single scheme that is well-suited across the
> > range from KBs to TBs (and beyond, when relevant).
> >
> > Lyra2 is less suitable for low sizes like this.
> >
>
> Just for the sake of clarity: why exactly? One can use Lyra2 with
> small-state sponges (e.g., Blake2s or even something smaller), for
> example, and the Lyra2 wrapper around this sponge would provide similar
> protection against attacks involving TMTO (if that is relevant) or
> parallel attacks (e.g., with bandwidth usage).
>
> I mean, without further arguments, I'm not sure I can provide
> counter-arguments... :)
>
> Anyhow we do have some research initiatives in our department in which
> we are planning to use Lyra2 on embedded systems and see interesting
> parameters/underlying sponges.
>
>
> Marcos.
>

I need to go carefully read the latest version, but IIRC, Lyra2 still does
no small random reads in it's inner loop, right?  Once you get down to L1
cache sized hashing, GPUs will dominate over CPUs, unless we do something
GPUs are not good at.  While this may not always be true, currently GPUs
are very slow at doing rapid small unpredictable reads.  The 64-byte block
size of Blake2b is as small a read as Lyra2 can do, isn't it?  Also, there
are repeated accesses in a row to the same address which GPUs do well, if
I'm not mistaken.  This is why I rated Yescrypt stronger at GPU defense in
general, but this is especially true at L1-cache sized hashes.  For larger
hashes, GPUs loose anyway.  For Scrypt, the parity point is around 4MiB.
For Yescrypt, I suspect it's closer to 16KiB.  Where is the parity point
for Lyra2?

By the way, I am a fan of Lyra2.  It's excellent work, and as I said
before, I will not be upset at all if Lyra2 is selected as the winner.
However, Yescrypt does gain improved defense for it's additional complexity.

Bill

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