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Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 18:22:13 +0200
From: Jakob Wenzel <jakob.wenzel@...-weimar.de>
To: discussions@...sword-hashing.net
Subject: Re: [PHC] Another PHC candidates "mechanical" tests (ROUND2)

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On 30.03.2015 13:52, Milan Broz wrote:
> On 03/30/2015 01:24 PM, Solar Designer wrote:
>> Milan,
>> 
>> On Tue, Mar 24, 2015 at 11:50:44PM +0100, Milan Broz wrote:
>>> The updated test report (draft) is here
>>> 
>>> https://github.com/mbroz/PHCtest/blob/master/output/phc_round2.pdf
>>
>>
>>>
>>> 
This really needs the cross-chart we discussed - memory usage vs. real
>> time with increasing m_cost and fixed lowest supported t_cost. 
>> From your charts, it was - and still is - not apparent to me
>> that (or whether?) POMELO v2 performs so well (as the author
>> claims) at large memory settings.
> 
> Yes, I'll plan to look into this soon.
> 
>> And you did not include it in Table 4 ("Ability to cover real 
>> use-case limits"), I guess because it was unclear even to you 
>> that it's competitive for your use case.
> 
> It is not there because I did not find any mention that POMELO can 
> be used directly as a KDF in the paper (and the use case is for 
> KDF). The garbage-collector attack paper 
> http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/881 also mentions that it is not KDF
> in Table 4.
> 
> Could authors clarify that?

Hi,

we did not mark POMELO as a KDF for the following reasons:

The authors of POMELO (v2)
1) ...did not claim that POMELO can be used as a KDF
2) ...neither claimed nor proved randomness of the outputs which is
   required for a good KDF

Best regards,
Jakob
(one of the authors of http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/881)


- -- 
Jakob Wenzel
Research Assistant
Chair of Media Security (Prof. Lucks)
Bauhausstra├če 11 (Room 217)
99423 Weimar
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