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Message-ID: <9A043F3CF02CD34C8E74AC1594475C73AAFD4A20@uxcn10-tdc05.UoA.auckland.ac.nz>
Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2015 09:20:43 +0000
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@...auckland.ac.nz>
To: "discussions@...sword-hashing.net" <discussions@...sword-hashing.net>
Subject: RE: [PHC] OMG we have benchmarks
<Stefan.Lucks@...-weimar.de> writes:
>I never understood why some bureaucrats at the NIST decided that four was too
>much, but three would be great, and then gave us the useless variant with 192-
>bit keys(*), instead of a 256-bit block size. This is one of the worst
>cryptographic choices the NIST ever made(**),
The SHA-2 mess wasn't so good either, we've ended up with:
SHA-256: Standard replacement for the universal hash, SHA-1.
SHA-512: SHA-256 for people with 64-bit processors and PDU space to waste.
SHA-also-ran: The 384-bit one that (presumably) the NSA demanded for Suite B,
but which has no other reason for existence.
SHA-glue-factory-candidate: The 224-bit one that was created because someone
at NIST had a few too many at one of the RSA conference
hospitality suites and bet a co-worker that they could get any
old rubbish into the SHA family [0].
Peter.
[0] Complete fiction, but it makes as much, or little, sense as any other
explanation.
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